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I. INTRODUCTION 
A common dynamic in contested Chapter 11 proceedings pits a 
firm’s shareholders against its creditors.  Unable to pay debts as they 
come due, the firm has petitioned for relief from creditors’ immediate 
attempts to levy on firm assets.  The bankruptcy judge will decide how 
best to reorganize the debtor firm.  Shareholders argue that the firm 
should continue operations and that it needs bankruptcy relief primarily 
to restructure current debt burden.  The firm will be profitable, 
shareholders argue, and consequently they deserve to participate to some 
extent in the restructured enterprise.  The creditors see things differently.  
The creditors argue that the firm’s operations are inefficient, that the best 
thing to do is liquidate assets, with proceeds going to satisfy debts before 
shareholders take a dime.  Shareholders and creditors have roughly equal 
information about the firm’s operations and prospects, yet they 
systematically disagree about the prudent course of action.  Shareholders 
want to continue operations; creditors want to liquidate. 
This dynamic is an example of a more general, persistent tension 
between investors with hierarchically differentiated claims on a firm’s 
assets—what this Article calls “vertical investor conflict.”  In a firm with 
a single class of investor (say, shareholders), the investors maximize the 
value of their investment by maximizing the firm’s expected 
profitability.  In choosing between two ventures, one risky and one safe, 
the investors ask themselves only whether the risk associated with the 
first project is offset by the returns it promises to generate if successful.  
If the project is risk-justified, the investors want to pursue it; if not, they 
want the firm to steer clear of the risk.  In this way such a firm directs its 
assets to the projects society values most highly—in expectation, 
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anyway.  Things become more complicated when a class of creditors is 
introduced.  The creditors, who have the right to be paid their debt but no 
more, favor the steady course even if the risky one could pay off big.  
Meanwhile the shareholders, who because of limited liability owe 
creditors no personal obligation if the firm fails, favor the risky venture.  
If the gamble pays off, the shareholders enjoy a sizeable return.  If not, 
they offload at least part of their losses on the creditors.  Neither 
shareholder nor creditor thinks the way a sole owner thinks. 
Vertical investor conflict is a chronic problem in modern business 
organizations.  Because the preferences of investors in a hierarchically 
differentiated firm differ from those in an equity-only firm, the conflict 
threatens to divert resources from their socially optimal use.  What is less 
clear is what, if anything, the law has to say about resolving these 
conflicts.  In general, a firm’s managers are entrusted to decide how to 
use its assets.  The question this Article takes up is how, if at all, the law 
should intervene when management’s view of the best course appears to 
be colored by investors’ divergent preferences. 
Courts that have addressed vertical investor conflict explicitly have 
framed the problem as one of fiduciary obligation.  Managers decide in 
the first instance what to do, but they are obliged to decide in accordance 
with their duty of loyalty.  But loyalty to whom?  Beginning with the 
seminal case of Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications,
1
 Delaware’s 
chancery and supreme courts have articulated a rule of corporate law 
under which the direction of management’s fiduciary duty of loyalty 
depends on the firm’s solvency.  Managers of a solvent firm owe 
obligations to shareholders only, not to creditors,
2
 but managers of an 
insolvent firm or a firm “in the vicinity of insolvency” may be required 
to take creditor as well as shareholder interests into account; they must 
consider what is best for a “community of interests.”
3
  As a matter of 
fiduciary principles, in other words, managers of a solvent firm may—
                                                 
 1.  Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 1991 
WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 2.  See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stating that no fiduciary 
duty is owed to creditors absent legislative action or expressly contracted indenture provisions). 
 3.  Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155 n.55; see also Prod. Res. Grp., v. NCT Grp., 
863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that managers of a firm that is near insolvency may 
be required to pursue a strategy that gives preference to neither stockholders nor creditors).  But see 
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) 
(holding that “no direct claim for breach of fiduciary duties may be asserted by the creditors of a 
solvent corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency”). 
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indeed, must—prefer shareholders over creditors.
4
  Managers of an 
insolvent or nearly insolvent firm face a more diffuse and hence less 
restrictive set of loyalties.
5
 
In the two decades since Credit Lyonnais, legal scholars have 
devoted numerous papers to critiquing this duty-shifting regime.  
Commentators have variously argued that managerial loyalty should run 
exclusively in favor of shareholders;
6
 that it should run in favor of 
creditors;
7
 that loyalty requires managers to act for a hypothetical, sole 
investor;
8
 and that judicially enforceable fiduciary obligations should be 
abolished altogether.
9
  Scholarly opinions vary, but they share the 
common assumption that, as a doctrinal matter, the duty of loyalty 
embodies the norms by which business managers are expected to resolve 
vertical investor conflict.  Scholarly debate has in other words turned on 
the way courts articulate, or should articulate, fiduciary standards. 
Another common thread runs through the existing literature.  In 
general, scholars have devoted little attention to how the fiduciary ideals 
they promote can be enforced in a world where the business judgment 
rule looms large.
10
  Ideals are well and good for managers who seek to 
                                                 
 4.  The focus here is Delaware corporate law because of its pervasive influence on questions 
of corporate governance.  Some states have declared by statute that managers may take the interests 
of non-shareholder constituencies into account.  In Oregon, for example, directors evaluating a 
tender offer may “give due consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on employees, 
customers and suppliers of the corporation and on the communities and geographical locations in 
which the corporation and its subsidiaries operate . . . .” OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2003). 
 5.  In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the obligation to creditors identified 
in Credit Lyonnais does not imply a cause of action for breach of the duty of loyalty.  930 A.2d at 
99–101.  The duty to creditors serves, in other words, as a shield to protect managers from liability 
to shareholders but not as a sword for creditors to assert wrongdoing.  
 6.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1446–47 (1993) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Defense]; Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty 
to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1402–03 (2007) 
 7.  Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 456 
(1986) [hereinafter McDaniel, Corporate Governance]; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and 
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 313–15 (1988) [hereinafter McDaniel, Stockholders]. 
 8.  Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation 
of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 268 (1999); see also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty 
upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 
1524 (1993) (arguing that an asset-value-maximization norm is efficient but that creditors should be 
required to bargain for explicit contractual rights rather than benefit from a freestanding fiduciary 
obligation). 
 9.  Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 
1315 (2008). 
 10.  Lin, supra note 8, at 1506–07, is a notable exception.  Lin posits that “[e]xtending the 
business judgment rule to shield the directors’ business decisions when they are challenged by 
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fulfill their legal obligations whatever the practical consequences.  They 
may even exert important expressive power.
11
  To the self-interested 
manager, however, they have little to say.  To the self-interested 
manager, a robust business judgment rule looks scarcely different from a 
world in which fiduciary obligations are formally defunct.  The question 
of deference must be central to any practical criticism of existing 
doctrine, and in this sense the literature has failed to engage with perhaps 
the most important consequence of Credit Lyonnais and its ilk.  On its 
face, Credit Lyonnais appeared to reduce managerial discretion by 
creating a previously unknown duty of loyalty to creditors.  But it did so 
by adding a new class of beneficiaries—namely creditors—to the 
fiduciary fold.  The decision thus charged managers with caring for a 
diffuse “community of interests” comprising shareholders as well as 
creditors, no one member of which has any particular claim of right.
12
  
With no metric by which to judge a manager’s success or failure, the 
effect of Delaware’s jurisprudence since Credit Lyonnais therefore may 
have been to insulate management decision-making through an 
expansion of the business judgment rule’s domain. 
This Article argues that scholarly debate over vertical investor 
conflict (and Delaware case law in particular) has missed the mark.  
First, on the question of ideals, this Article challenges the unanimous 
assumption that fiduciary duty holds the doctrinal key to vertical investor 
conflict.  Preoccupation with the role of fiduciary duty might be 
attributable to myopia inherent in the discrete jurisdictions of the courts 
and, to a lesser degree, of the academy.  Courts accustomed to hearing 
equitable claims may find it natural to frame problems in terms of 
                                                 
creditors can alleviate th[e] concern for potential abuse.” Id.  The business judgment rule says that 
courts will not second-guess a disinterested manager’s good-faith decisions made with due care.  
E.g., In re Citigroup S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (stating that the 
business judgment rule “prevents judicial second guessing of the decision if the directors employed a 
rational process and considered all material information reasonably available”).  It is a rule of 
deference, albeit one with play in the joints.  For example, the concept of due care has proved elastic 
in the hands of a suspicious court.  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985) 
(reversing the chancery court’s application of the business judgment rule even though the directors 
claimed to be “well-informed”). 
 11.  See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 224, 228  (2007) (exploring the “expressive holdings” of 
judges who suggest that corporate directors owe creditors fiduciary duties during periods of financial 
distress, yet who refuse to formally hold so). 
 12.  Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 1991 
WL 277613, 1156 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
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fiduciary obligation—an example of Kaplan’s law of the instrument.
13
  
Whatever the reason, courts and commentators have paid insufficient 
attention to the ways in which general debtor-creditor law aims to 
influence corporate management in the ordinary course.  This Article 
argues as a descriptive matter that longstanding fraudulent transfer 
principles point toward an existing norm of asset-value maximization.  
For five hundred years, fraudulent transfer law has prohibited debtors 
from intentionally “delaying, hindering, or defrauding” creditors.
14
  This 
Article offers a theory of fraudulent transfer which, in combination with 
a traditional, shareholder-focused conception of fiduciary duty, describes 
a norm under which a manager should seek to maximize the expected 
value of her firm’s assets.  On this theory, in other words, a manager can 
simultaneously satisfy her duty of loyalty to shareholders and the firm’s 
obligations to creditors only by seeking to maximize the firm’s expected 
value to investors as a whole.
15
 
Proponents of a value-maximization norm are on sure footing as a 
descriptive matter.  The critical question becomes one of institutional 
competence.  As a realistic matter, that is, one has to ask to what extent 
asset-value maximization is an enforceable norm and not just a piece of 
wishful thinking.  In doctrinal terms the question is how robustly courts 
ought to interpret rules of deference to management.
16
  Decisions such as 
Credit Lyonnais and Gheewalla suggest that, from Delaware’s 
perspective, at least, judicial second-guessing is a nonstarter.
17
  This 
                                                 
 13.  Abraham Kaplan describes the “law of the instrument” as: “Give a small boy a hammer, 
and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding.”  ABRAHAM KAPLAN,  THE 
CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 28 (Transaction Publishers, 4th 
prtg., 2004) (1964).  
 14.  The formulation dates to Queen Elizabeth’s reign.  1570, 13 Eliz., c. 5 (Eng.). 
 15.  Others have argued that a rule of asset-value maximization is economically rational.  See, 
e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 214–18; Lin, supra note 8, at 1497; see also Baird & Henderson, supra 
note 9, at 1313 (describing this view as dominant among economists and legal scholars influenced 
by economic theory).  Some courts have found a corresponding norm in the federal law applicable to 
debtors in bankruptcy.  See, e.g., In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 841 F.2d 732, 734–75 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 16.  When shareholders allege breach of fiduciary duty, the rule of deference is the business 
judgment rule.  In re Citigroup S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009).  When 
creditors allege fraudulent transfer, there is a corresponding principle of deference—namely, the 
requirement that the creditor prove bad intent.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304 (2012) 
(prohibiting transfers made by a debtor “[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor 
of the debtor”). 
 17.  See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *1143  (Del. Ch. 1991) (“I do not conclude 
lightly or easily that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was violated here.  The entire course 
of conduct of defendant . . . does, however, force me to that conclusion.”); N. Am. Catholic Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) (“Delaware courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to expand existing fiduciary duties.”). 
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Article argues that the degree to which courts defer to managerial 
decisions should depend on the quality of market signals available.  For 
firms with widely traded securities, the Article shows how capital 
markets can give teeth to an asset-value-maximization norm within the 
framework of existing causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and 
fraudulent transfer.  By observing changes in the market prices of a 
firm’s securities after management has announced a strategic plan, courts 
can learn valuable information, at low cost, about whether a manager has 
(or has not) deviated from the law’s ideal.  The threat of accurate and 
inexpensive litigation can be expected in turn to improve managerial 
discipline.  Litigation holds less promise of identifying wrongdoing in 
the case of closely held firms, and consequently judicial deference 
should be at its maximum when investors in close firms challenge 
managerial decisions.  And yet, this Article argues, the close firm is not a 
hopeless case.  It is in precisely the close context where, because of low 
transaction costs, managers are most likely to maximize asset value 
without legal intervention. 
But this anticipates too much.  Before we can hope to judge the 
utility of particular rules we must understand more fully the dynamic that 
generates vertical investor conflict and the ways in which managers can 
be expected to resolve it absent legal intervention.  Although the basic 
phenomenon of conflict is widely observed and well documented, the 
legal literature lacks a comprehensive account of its dimensions.  Part II 
of this Article seeks to provide such an account.  To that end it develops 
a unique model of a two-investor-class firm operating in a two-period 
world.  Consistent with experience, the model predicts that conflict will 
increase with a firm’s financial distress.  It is under conditions of distress 
that shareholders and creditors alike will most aggressively agitate for 
the firm to use assets in a socially suboptimal manner.  Yet the model 
also shows that there is nothing magical about insolvency—the point at 
which debts exceed asset value.  Vertical investor conflict builds 
continuously, before and after a firm becomes insolvent, and in this sense 
the model suggests that a duty-shifting regime is hard to justify.  Part II 
then seeks to understand how managers unconstrained by law will 
resolve investor conflict.  To the extent managers have incentives to 
maximize asset value without the threat of judicial intervention, the error 
and administrative costs associated with intervention will appear 
wasteful.  Although under certain conditions managers can be expected 
to resolve conflict through a value-maximizing use of assets, Part II 
shows that these conditions are difficult to observe.  It is not possible to 
predict as a general matter whether a manager faced with conflict will 
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favor shareholders, favor creditors, or act to maximize the firm’s 
expected value. 
Part III turns to the ideals embodied in our law.  In light of the 
ambiguous way in which managers can be expected to react to vertical 
investor conflict, this Part asks how law would have them behave.  It 
begins with a survey of existing judicial and scholarly commentary on 
the subject, highlighting the doctrinal focus on competing rules of 
fiduciary duty.  It then develops a theory of fraudulent transfer which, 
read in combination with a traditional vision of fiduciary duty, points to 
an ideal of asset-value maximization. 
Part IV takes up the problem of realizing this ideal through concrete 
legal intervention.  In particular, it evaluates the means by which law can 
encourage self-interested managers to abide to the asset-value-
maximization norm where questions of institutional competence and 
collateral costs loom large.  This Part argues that legal intervention holds 
most promise where markets efficiently price a firm’s securities and, 
therefore, that judicial deference to management should be at its lowest 
in these circumstances.  In the case of closely held firms, by contrast, this 
Part argues that legal intervention can do little to discipline managers 
effectively. 
II. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF VERTICAL INVESTOR CONFLICT 
It is no secret that shareholders and creditors of a business firm often 
disagree about how the firm should use its assets.  They may, for 
example, disagree about the expected profitability—the relative risks and 
rewards—of projects available to the firm.  If a widget manufacturing 
firm is deciding whether to build a new factory, shareholders and 
creditors might differ in their views on the market for widgets.  A 
shareholder could believe that demand for widgets is very likely to grow 
in the next ten years.  With additional capacity, she might think, the firm 
will be able to take advantage of consumer demand.  A creditor could 
take the opposite view, that widgets are a fad and that the firm 
consequently will not be able to recoup its investment in the new facility.  
This is a conflict over predictions about facts and the expected effect of a 
firm’s activities on its balance sheet, and corporate law furnishes a 
straightforward resolution.  It assigns the decision to the firm’s 
management.
18
  Shareholders can remove directors by vote, but in 
                                                 
 18.  A small number of extraordinary corporate actions require stockholder consent.  In 
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general an investor who is unhappy with management’s resolution of this 
kind of dispute must find what solace she can in the marketplace, by 
selling her interest in the firm. 
A balance-sheet dispute can arise between any two investors.  There 
is nothing special about one’s identity as a shareholder or creditor.  
Balance-sheet disputes thus are an example of what one can call 
horizontal investor conflict: conflict in which the investors’ relative 
priority in a hierarchical capital structure plays no role.  This Article is 
concerned with vertical conflict.  Vertical investor conflict arises even 
where all agree about the expected risks and rewards of a firm’s activities 
(and potential activities) to its balance sheet.  Prediction about the future, 
interpretation of facts relevant to the firm’s business, is not decisive.  In 
this sense vertical investor conflict poses questions of corporate law—
who decides how the conflict should be resolved, and according to what 
standard?—that may have answers different from horizontal investor 
conflict.  The key to vertical investor conflict is not “outside” the firm, in 
its relations with other persons.  It is rather built into the very nature of 
hierarchically organized capital structures.  Before turning to ways in 
which the law responds (or could respond) to vertical investor conflict, 
we must first learn to diagnose it and to assess how managers are likely 
to respond to it. 
A. Diagnosing Vertical Investor Conflict 
To begin, imagine a firm, Acme, with a single class of equity.  At 
time 0, Acme borrows from its lone creditor and issues a $100 note 
payable at time 1.  At time 0, Acme’s manager is confronted with three 
mutually exclusive projects the firm could pursue.  One is risky, one 
safe, and one entails intermediate risk.  Imagine further that everyone 
agrees on Acme’s payoff possibilities at time 1.  Relative to time 0, 
Project A has a 50% chance of earning $40, and a 50% chance of losing 
$80, for an expected value of $-20.  Project B has a 100% chance of 
losing $5.  This might be a divestment of a division.  Project C has a 50% 
                                                 
Delaware, for example, stockholders must approve a decision to merge or dissolve the firm.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 251(c) (merger), 275 (dissolution) (2012).  In general, though, the firm’s 
officers, acting under the supervision of the board of directors, are competent to decide most 
questions on which a predictive dispute could arise.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 142(a) (2012). Some 
questions are reserved to the board itself.  For my purposes in this Article, the assignment of a 
question to the board or to officers acting under the board’s supervision is irrelevant.  Consequently 
this Article ignores the identity of the representative and refers generally to the firm’s “management” 
or, at the risk of too much simplification, its “manager.” 
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chance of earning $20 and a 50% chance of losing $10, for an expected 
value of $5. 
Summary of expected effects on Acme’s balance sheet 
 Project A Project B Project C 
Expected Balance Sheet -20 -5 5 
 
Which of the projects will the shareholders and the creditor prefer?  
If a single investor owned the entire firm (the equity and the debt), it is 
easy to see what she would want.  She would unambiguously prefer 
Project C.
19
  The answer is more complicated, though, when the equity 
and debt are held by different persons. 
A financially healthy firm approximates the single-owner result.  
Suppose that at time 0 Acme holds assets with a liquidation value of 
$2,000.  By hypothesis the creditor’s principal is assured under any 
scenario.  At worst, Acme will lose $80 over the period from time 0 to 
time 1.  The remaining assets, worth $1,920, are more than enough to 
satisfy the creditor’s claim (i.e., $100).  Thus, the creditor is indifferent 
between the projects.  Shareholders, meanwhile, will unambiguously 
prefer Project C.  In this healthy state, the shareholders internalize all 
expected losses (because the creditor is fully secured), as well as all 
expected gains (because the creditor’s principal and interest rate are set).  
The shareholders prefer the project with an expected $5 gain. 
But now suppose another firm, Acme′, identical to Acme in every 
way except that it is financially distressed.  Acme′ owns assets worth 
$105.  Setting aside option value, the equity is worth $5.  Which project 
do the investors in Acme′ want the firm to pursue?  Plainly, the 
investors’ preferences have diverged.  Shareholders will agitate for the 
firm to pursue Project A.  Project A entails a 50% chance that their $5 of 
equity will be wiped out and a 50% chance they will earn $40.  
Shareholder’s expected return from Project A is $17.50.  Projects B and 
                                                 
 19.  This Article assumes throughout that all investors are privately risk-neutral—that is, that 
investors’ utility of a dollar received from the firm describes a linear function.  This is a common 
assumption, because although the risk tolerances of real individuals are heterogeneous, investors 
may hedge risk they want to avoid (and may take on additional risks they want to incur) through 
investments outside the firm.  See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 29–30 (1991).  Even if investors cannot perfectly 
hedge risk through diversification, this Article’s claims hold as long as the aggregate risk tolerances 
are symmetric across the capital structure.  If there is no reason to think that bondholders, say, are 
systematically more or less risk-tolerant than shareholders, then one could easily correct this 
Article’s results from dollars into utils. 
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C hold far worse prospects.  Project B is certain to wipe out shareholder 
equity.  If Acme′ undertakes Project C, the shareholders face a 50% 
chance that their equity will be wiped out and a 50% chance that they 
will earn $20.  Their expected return, $7.50, is smaller than the $17.50 
they expect from Project A. 
Arithmetic shows that the creditor’s ranked preferences are opposite 
to those of the shareholders.  If Acme′ undertakes Project A, there is a 
50% chance that the creditor will recover his entire principal and a 50% 
chance that he will lose $75 (expected loss of $37.50).  Project B is sure 
to leave the creditor unimpaired.  And Project C promises a 50% chance 
of full recovery and a 50% chance of a $5 loss (expected loss of $2.50). 
Summary of Expected Payouts (Acme′) 
 Project A Project B Project C 
Shareholders 17.50 -5 7.50 
Creditor -37.50 0 -2.50 
Sole Owner -20 -5 5 
 
This simple example illustrates an important dynamic that holds true 
in more complicated models.  Divergence of interest between 
shareholders and creditors—in fact, between any two classes of investor 
with hierarchical rights to a firm’s cash flows—depends on the firm’s 
financial health rather than anything peculiar to the investors themselves.  
As a firm approaches insolvency, its shareholders stand to gain from 
earnings, but because of their limited liability, suffer only a portion of 
losses.  Limited liability allows them to externalize risk.  Conversely, 
losses impair the creditor’s interest in a manner that corresponding gains 
will not offset (because, at the beginning of any period, the creditor’s 
maximum return is fixed).  The creditor will urge the firm to forego even 
expectation-justified risky projects. 
Investors and financial economists have long grasped the 
fundamental problem of vertical investor conflict and the correlative 
question of risk alteration.
20
  But although the literature on corporate 
governance recognizes the issue, scholars in the field have until now 
been content to point to it only in a general way.
21
  My aim in this Article 
                                                 
 20.  See, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 
2103, 2105–06 (1994); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309–10 (1976); EUGENE F. 
FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 120 (1972). 
 21.  See supra note 20.  
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is to evaluate the law’s response to vertical investor conflict.  To do so, 
we must develop the problem more systematically than legal scholars 
have done—to understand where vertical investor conflict is likely to 
emerge, and to what degree. 
We can continue with the straightforward assumption that both 
shareholders and creditors attempt to maximize the expected value of 
their respective interests.  By comparing the investors’ profit identities, 
we can learn under what conditions and to what extent the interests will 
conflict.  Assume a two-period world.  At time 0, the firm has assets 
worth A0 and an outstanding debt of P0, due at time 1.  Putting aside 
option value for the moment, the value of equity at time 0 is E0 = A0 – 
P0.
22
  At time 0 the firm will undertake a portfolio of projects the returns 
on which (at time 1) are normally distributed with an identifiable mean 
(μ) and variance (σ).  In other words, the investors and manager agree on 
the expected value and risk of the firm’s projects.  Thus, A1 is a random 
variable and expected A1 = A0 + μ. 
Start with the shareholder’s profit identity.  The crucial fact here is 
the doctrine of limited liability, under which a creditor may not hold 
shareholders to the fire for defaults on principal due.
23
  The future value 
of asset A is random, because the future is uncertain, but it can be 
defined as follows: 
 
(1)       [
                     
                             
].  
 
Equity at time 1 is the difference between time 1 asset value and debt 
if that difference is positive, and zero otherwise.  Equity E1 is, like A1, a 
random variable, but with a discontinuous distribution.  Its expected 
value is 
 
(2)     ̅̅ ̅  {[  ̅̅ ̅   (
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namely the expected difference between asset value and debt if that 
difference is positive, times the probability that the difference will be 
                                                 
 22.  One can think of E0 as the value shareholders would recover if the firm were liquidated at 
time 0.  
 23.  See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 331. 
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positive.  If, as we will assume here along with much of the literature, 
asset value A1 is normally distributed,   ̅̅ ̅  is the expected value of the 
truncated portion of the normal distribution above debt P0, assuming P0 
has been netted out of every asset realization before it is awarded to the 
shareholder. 
Equation (2) then just says that shareholders’ expected equity value 
is the product of that truncated mean and the probability that A1 > P0. 
Employing the formula for the mean of the relevant truncated portion 
of the normal density function, namely where shareholder return goes to 
zero when asset value equals or falls short of debt P0, gives 
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where (P0 – Ā) / σ = z is the standard-normal variate.  Multiplying 
through gives 
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The shareholder’s expected equity is a function of asset mean and 
risk, although weights 1 – Φ and φ themselves depend on these very 
factors as well as on the debt principal.  We shall refer to the 
corresponding change in shareholder equity as her expected profit μsh = 
Ē1 – E0, that is 
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This formal statement of shareholder profit suggests a few important 
points about how a shareholder is likely to view a firm’s potential 
projects.  Note first that the profit a shareholder associates with any 
project portfolio is a weighted sum of the portfolio’s expected social 
value—namely the overall asset value it is expected to generate—and its 
risk.  It takes the form μsh = Kμ + Jσ.  Unlike the owner of an all-equity 
firm, who cares only about expected value, the shareholder in a 
hierarchically differentiated capital structure rationally thinks about the 
effect risk has on her profit. 
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A few more words are in order.  First, because φ[(P0 – Ā)/σ] is a 
probability of a standard normal variate, it is positive.  Thus, in the 
presence of limited liability, greater portfolio risk always brings the 
shareholder greater expected profit.  The size of this effect, and thus 
risk’s potency in generating mean profit, rises as P0 – Ā falls toward zero 
because φ is a maximum at that point.  And because declining P0 – Ā 
equivalently boosts the firm’s debt-to-asset ratio P0/Ā, the shareholder’s 
incentive to adopt high-risk portfolios approaches its maximum when her 
equity E0 = A0 – P0 approaches zero and the firm approaches insolvency. 
Furthermore, greater portfolio risk σ itself boosts risk’s positive 
influence on expected profit because, provided expected assets exceed 
debt, rising σ reduces (P0 – Ā)/σ and thus lifts φ.  In sum, a risk-neutral 
shareholder will act as a risk-seeker in her common stock investments, 
and increasingly so as either the firm approaches insolvency or finds 
opportunities to invest in high-risk portfolios. 
Not surprisingly, a rising expected value Ā of the firm’s projects 
itself will boost the shareholder’s mean return.  That is, coefficient 1 – 
Φ[(P0 – Ā)/σ] of mean return Ā in equation (4) is the probability that the 
firm’s assets at time 1 will be greater than P0—and this probability, 
although less than one, will always be positive.  (Think of it as the 
probability that a liquidation at time 1 will generate cash for 
shareholders.)  All else equal, in other words, shareholders prefer high 
over low expected-value portfolios in addition to high-risk ones.  
Shareholders will seek to maximize the expected value of the firm’s 
assets for any fixed amount of risk.  They will always prefer that assets 
be efficiently used, pushing the firm toward opportunities on its expected 
value-variance frontier.  In sum, shareholders prefer a high-value project 
over a low-value project, and they prefer a risky venture to a safe one, at 
a relative rate that depends on the firm’s distance from insolvency and on 
the portfolio risk itself. 
Until now we have been discussing shareholders’ wishes.  We need 
also to consider the firm’s opportunities, that is, the way Ā and σ trade 
off in the marketplace.  Economic theory tells us that on the firm’s 
market frontier, the expected value of available projects is related to their 
risk.  A risk-neutral investor seeks opportunities which maximize 
expected value, whatever their variance.  By definition, a risk-seeking 
(risk-averse) investor is one who is willing to accept lower expected 
value in order to increase (decrease) variance. 
The tradeoff between expected value and risk that shareholders 
prefer is the tradeoff that maximizes their expected profit.  
Mathematically inclined readers will see immediately that the 
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mechanism by which shareholders best exploit the risk-expected value 
tradeoff available to them in the market lies in the coefficients in 
equation (4).  The coefficients indicate that a shareholder will become 
increasingly insensitive to risk—will increasingly seek expected value 
relative to risk—as expected assets increase relative to debt owed.  To 
see this, hold everything in equation (4) constant except assets.  Imagine 
assets growing large relative to principal owed.  As assets relative to 
principal increases, P0 – A1 takes on a large negative value.  This value 
lies in the left tail, so to speak, of the probability distribution.  The 
cumulative probability of such an outlier goes to zero as assets go to 
infinity, and consequently the coefficient of the expected-value term goes 
to one.  At the same time, the coefficient of the risk term goes to zero.  In 
other words, the social expected-value term increasingly dominates the 
shareholders’ profit equation as the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio falls.  The 
intuition is straightforward.  A firm with a small debt-to-assets ratio 
approaches the all-equity or single-owner firm described above.  And 
recall that shareholders in an all-equity firm care only about the expected 
value of the firm’s projects.  As the debt-to-assets ratio increases, on the 
other hand, the coefficient of the expected-value term diminishes and the 
coefficient of the risk term increases.  In descriptive terms, the impact of 
risk on the shareholders’ profit equation increases as the firm’s expected 
debt-to-assets ratio increases.  The greater the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio, 
the more a shareholder will be expected to agitate for risk at the expense 
of expected value. 
We can derive the expected value of a creditor’s interest (P1) and 
expected profit (μcr) in a similar fashion.  Here the starting point is 
twofold: (1) the creditor’s maximum recovery is P0, which he receives 
whenever A1 ≥ P0, and (2) the creditor receives A1 whenever A1 < P0.  
 
(6)      [
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If at time 0 the firm is solvent, then it is helpful to think of the 
interval between time 0 and time 1 as exposing the creditor to losses 
only.  Creditor’s “profit” equation takes on a strictly negative (or zero) 
value.  In the interest of conserving paper and time, I give the creditor’s 
profit equation as follows: 
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Like shareholders, a creditor will always prefer high expected-value 
projects over low-value projects, all else equal.  To understand the 
intuition at play, think of a high expected-value project as shifting the 
distribution of possible assets at time 1 to the right.  Holding risk 
constant, boosting a project’s expected value will reduce the cumulative 
probability that assets at time 1 will be less than P0.  That is, the higher 
the project’s mean return, the greater is the likelihood that the firm will 
have assets sufficient to pay off the creditor in full. 
Unlike shareholders, though, a creditor dislikes risk.  In fact, a 
positive change in risk decreases a creditor’s expected recovery by 
precisely the amount it increases shareholders’ expected profit.  Risk 
alteration has zero-sum consequences.
24
  Holding all else constant, 
increasing the variance of a firm’s performance decreases the creditor’s 
expected recovery.  Creditors prefer high-value, low-risk projects.  But 
as in the case of the shareholder, the creditor seeking to maximize his 
expected profit must trade off between expected value and risk among 
projects available in the market.  When the firm is highly solvent, the 
expected-value term dominates the creditor’s profit equation—just as it 
does for, and for the same reasons as in, the shareholder’s profit 
equation.  But as the firm’s expected debt-to-assets ratio increases, so 
does the relative importance of risk in the creditor’s profit.  As the firm 
approaches insolvency, a creditor is increasingly willing to trade high-
value for low-risk projects. 
Modeling shareholder and creditor payouts as we have reveals some 
important points about vertical investor conflict.  First, the presence of 
conflict between vertically differentiated investors does not depend on 
differences in their risk tolerances.  The model above assumes that each 
investor is risk neutral.  It shows that a risk-neutral shareholder will 
appear risk-seeking in the context of her investment in a limited-liability 
firm, and that a risk-neutral creditor will appear risk-averse in the 
context of his investment in the same firm.  Nor does a conflict 
necessarily turn on differing estimates of projects’ expected balance-
                                                 
 24.  This is not strictly true if only the firm’s creditors at time 0 are taken into account.  Because 
limited liability protects existing creditors from reprisal by future creditors in the same way it 
protects shareholders, increasing risk can in extreme cases generate a positive sum for investors at 
time 0.  Think, for example, of a firm that at time 0 considers moving into the chemicals industry, 
taking on potentially massive environmental liability.  I set aside this possibility here in order to 
focus on the typical case.  For an argument that the problem is smaller than scholars have suggested 
(and for a thoughtful discussion of the related literature), see Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to 
Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037, 
1038–46 (2008).  
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sheet effect or risk.  Our model has assumed that each investor knows (or 
at least agrees on) the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio at time 0, as well as the 
expected value of and risk associated with the firm’s possible projects.  
The investors’ differing rights in the firm, apart from their private 
characteristics, causes vertical investor conflict. 
Second, the magnitude of vertical investor conflict depends on the 
firm’s debt-to-assets ratio.  Shareholder and creditor interests are never 
perfectly aligned.  Shareholders always display some risk-seeking 
tendency and creditors always appear risk-averse.  But when the firm is 
highly solvent—when, that is, assets are large relative to debt—the 
conflict practically disappears.  When the firm is highly solvent, the 
expected value of the firm’s projects dominate the profit equations of 
shareholder and creditor alike.  As the debt-to-assets ratio goes to zero, 
the vertically differentiated investors’ unity becomes perfect and seeks 
asset-value-maximizing projects.  Investors in such a firm will agree on 
how the firm should operate, subject only to the caveat that a creditor and 
shareholder, like any two shareholders or any two creditors, might 
disagree about which ventures in particular are likely to maximize 
expected asset value.  As the firm approaches insolvency, on the other 
hand, shareholders and creditors become increasingly risk-sensitive.  
Both classes of investor increasingly care about the risk rather than the 
expected balance-sheet effect of the firm’s projects.
25
 
Another way to think of the dynamic is to start by considering the 
expected (social) value of a firm’s potential projects.  When a firm is 
highly solvent—or, to take the extreme case, when all of the claims 
against a firm’s assets are in the hands of a single investor—the expected 
social value of the firm’s available projects dominates the investors’ 
private profit identities.  What is best in expectation for the firm’s 
balance sheet is also best for the investors’ pocketbooks.  But as the 
firm’s debt-to-assets ratio increases, the risk associated with available 
projects takes on increasing importance to the investors.  As we saw in 
the hypothetical above, both shareholder and creditor will wish the firm 
to forego the projects with the greatest social value—although their 
reasons for doing so and the direction in which they push the firm will be 
strictly opposed.  Neither shareholder nor creditor will seek the social 
                                                 
 25.  This analysis of course assumes that the firm’s capital structure is fixed.  As we shall see, 
the prospect of restructuring, including the outright unification of the capital structure through 
buyout, may temper investors’ apparent deviation from risk neutrality.  Indeed, in a world without 
transaction costs the existence of possible restructuring would eliminate vertical investor conflict 
entirely. 
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optimum. 
B. Managerial Incentives under Conditions of Conflict 
At first blush, managers rather than shareholders or creditors decide 
how to deploy a firm’s assets.  Understanding how managers are likely to 
react to vertical investor conflict absent legal intervention is thus crucial 
to an evaluation of law’s domain.  How do managers act in the face of 
vertical investor conflict?  Whom do they favor, if anyone?  At first 
approximation, it is fair to say that a person works for those who can fire 
her.  In a healthy firm, shareholders ultimately hold the right to fire, and 
one can conveniently think of management as their (imperfect) agents.  
But there is a competing and equally apt maxim: one’s boss tomorrow is 
one’s boss today.  Lame ducks command little allegiance.  A manager 
who believes that someone other than today’s shareholders will hold the 
whip hand tomorrow tries to satisfy the heir apparent.  This section 
explores the manager–investor dynamic in financially distressed firms.  It 
aims to show that managerial reaction to vertical investor conflict is 
ambiguous.  Theory cannot tell us much about the risk tolerance 
managers will exhibit—whether, in other words, they will tend to favor 
shareholders or creditors.  Managers are likely to seek projects entailing 
more risk than creditors want but less than shareholders do.  This 
ambiguity has important consequences.  Among other things, it means 
that third-party observers, courts among them, lack a stable presumption 
about the kind of projects the manager of a distressed firm is likely to 
choose.  Investor dissatisfaction can serve at best as a weak signal of 
deviation from a legal norm (unless the legal rule is that managers should 
always act in the interest of one or another constituency). 
On the traditional view of corporate governance, managers are 
thought to be aligned principally with a firm’s shareholders.  Directors 
serve at the mercy of the shareholders’ vote; officers serve at the board’s.  
Although ousters are rare in public companies, the mere threat of a proxy 
fight or takeover attempt disciplines managers who might otherwise 
ignore dispersed shareholders.  Similarly, managers often hold, and are 
expected to hold, a significant equity stake in the firms they manage, 
aligning incentives.  This is not to say that theorists of the firm have 
understood managers as faithful agents.  That idea was long ago 
discredited, and an extensive agency-cost literature describes the 
tendency of a firm’s managers to shirk responsibilities, consume 
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excessive perquisites, or otherwise self-deal.
26
  But the accepted view has 
been that, in a choice between shareholders and creditors, the manager 
would, and perhaps should, naturally support the shareholders.
27
 
Recent scholarship has questioned the conventional wisdom, 
focusing on the power of creditors, especially senior bank lenders, to 
influence management’s investment decisions.
28
  Most directly, a lender 
might control the firm’s risk profile through covenants restricting capital 
expenditures or fundamental changes to the firm’s business model.
29
 
Because risk alteration often depends on significant outlays, as for 
example when a firm wishes to enter a new line of business, the veto 
associated with these covenants is for better or worse a powerful check 
on shareholder preferences. 
Covenants facially having nothing to do with investment policy offer 
creditors a subtler, yet equally important lever to influence manager 
behavior.
30
  A typical bank loan includes manifold covenants.
31
  Some 
relate to the firm’s financial condition.  For example, the debtor may 
covenant that the ratio of its earnings to outstanding debt will remain 
above an agreed threshold.
32
  Other ubiquitous covenants relate only 
                                                 
 26.  See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220–32 (1932) (discussing the social expectations and legal rules 
impacting managerial behavior); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 312–13 (comparing 
the incentives and behavior of an owner–manager to that of a manager of a firm owned by outside 
investors). 
 27.  See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private 
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 123–25 (2009) (describing the 
conventional wisdom); see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in 
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1076–77 (1995). 
 28.  Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 
J. LEG. ANALYSIS 511, 538–39 (2009); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and 
the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1251 (2006); Triantis & 
Daniels, supra note 27, at 1082–91; Tung, supra note 27, at 125–35.  Financial economists began 
considering creditor influence somewhat earlier. See, e.g., Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, 
Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 400 (2009); Clifford W. 
Smith Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. 
ECON. 117 (1979). 
 29.  A recent study finds that roughly 25 percent of public corporations have a bank loan 
agreement with a capital expenditure restriction.  Nini et al., supra note 28, at 405. 
 30.  Frederick Tung offers a thoughtful account of this form of creditor influence. See Tung, 
supra note 27, at 140–59.  He finds that “covenant violations are common, even among well-run 
companies.”  Id. at 134.  See also Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 28, at 1227–36 (discussing the 
evolving law permitting lenders to have increasing control over major corporations through strict 
covenants). 
 31.  For a sampling of the kinds of covenants often accompanying bank debt, see THE LSTA’S 
COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE (Richard Wright, et al., eds.) 281–389 (2009). 
 32.  For examples of common financial covenants, see id. at 293–310. 
  
2013] BEYOND INSOLVENCY 19 
indirectly to the firm’s financial health: the promise to maintain 
appropriate insurance, for example, or to furnish data concerning the 
firm’s business.
33
  The violation of any covenant typically empowers the 
lender to call its loan due immediately.  This right provides considerable 
leverage.  If the debt owed to creditor C is large relative to the firm’s 
liquid asset base, a decision by C to accelerate his loan’s maturity can 
effectively force the firm into Chapter 11.  Formal reorganization is 
costly, and especially so for the officers of a corporate debtor, most of 
whom can expect to be shown the door.
34
  A CEO who values her job, or 
who values a soft landing after dismissal, is therefore inclined to listen 
carefully to a creditor’s advice after a covenant violation.  And the same 
is true even before a firm trips the control wire by violating a covenant.  
The manager of a distressed firm knows only too well that a technical 
default lurks around the corner; that the firm’s ability to satisfy its 
covenants will turn to some degree on fortune.  The manager thus weighs 
her options with bankruptcy looming in the shadow.
35
 
It is not just that creditors, as a class, have leverage comparable to 
that of shareholders, as a class.  Creditors may also be more adept at 
using it.  The power to enforce loan covenants typically rests with a 
single bank or a small syndicate of lenders.  According to one theory of 
capital structure, this concentrated interest among the senior creditors is 
vital to efficient monitoring of management slack.
36
  The power to fire 
directors and, indirectly, senior executives, on the other hand, is widely 
dispersed among shareholders.  Thus, the concentration of interest that 
makes a good monitor also makes a good user of leverage. 
A manager set on keeping her job faces an ambiguous landscape.  
We have seen that as a firm moves toward insolvency, its shareholders 
and creditors alike will agitate for risk alteration.  Shareholders might 
fire the manager if, from their perspective, her investment decisions are 
too risk-averse.  Yet by pursuing a relatively risk-seeking strategy (to 
pacify shareholders), the manager exposes herself to the possibility that a 
vigilant creditor will invoke a covenant default to oust her; and, of 
                                                 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 28, at 512–20 (finding that 70 percent of CEOs are 
replaced within the two years following the bankruptcy filing). 
 35.  See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 28, at 1209–11 (connecting the firing of Krispy 
Kreme’s CEO, outside formal bankruptcy proceedings, to the implied threat of creditor action).  
 36.  Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE 
L.J. 49, 57–59 (1982) (explaining that for a lender to have the proper incentives to monitor, it has to 
enjoy the benefits of monitoring).  
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course, it is precisely when the firm is financially distressed that 
covenant default is most likely.  How the manager gauges the investors’ 
relative power will turn on particulars: the relative concentration of 
interest in the investor classes, the nature of the covenants in place 
(especially the perceived likelihood of a default), and even the 
personalities of key investors. 
The manager faces a dilemma whatever her assessment of these 
factors.  Multiple strategies are plausible.  Suppose, for example, the 
manager thinks shareholder and bank power is in equipoise.  She thinks 
that at future time t there is a fifty percent chance that the bank will 
effectively have the firing power.  One strategy would be to pursue a 
middle path, a risk-neutral investment strategy.  The manager pursuing 
this strategy hopes that her decision will not anger either constituency 
too much.  She may be disappointed to learn, however, that she angered 
both.  Each constituency has another manager in mind.  Depending on 
the situation, then, the manager might decide to cast her lots with one or 
another constituency. 
A self-interested manager’s regard for her job is of course only one 
factor determining her optimal strategy.  It is hard to imagine an 
executive who is not also a passive investor in the firm she manages.  
The firm’s operations are bound to have wealth effects on these 
investments.  Here again, though, the net effect on the manager’s 
apparent risk tolerance is a question about which little in the abstract can 
be said.  Most managers—most officers, anyway—hold common stock.  
Employment agreements often mandate it.  As a stockholder, the 
manager will tend to favor a risk-seeking investment strategy.  But 
managers often hold debt or claims against the firm with debt-like 
characteristics.
37
  As a creditor (or quasi-creditor), the manager will tend 
to favor a risk-averse investment strategy. 
One can think of a self-interested manager as choosing investment 
strategies that promise to maximize the expected value of her own, 
private wealth identity.  The manager derives wealth from passive 
shareholding, passive debt holding, and from employment (in the form of 
salary and perquisites), the last of which itself depends on satisfying both 
shareholders and creditors.  Thus, the manager’s profit equation is a 
                                                 
 37.  Defined-benefit pension interests are effectively debt.  A deferred compensation plan is 
another example.  Deferred compensation promises the manager a fixed payment (similar to the face 
value of a bond) at a future, specified date (similar to a maturity date).  The manager faces downside 
risk but has no upside. 
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weighted average of the shareholder and creditor profit equations.  In the 
language of the model above, the self-interested manager seeks to 
maximize the following equation: 
 




where the coefficient   is the weight accorded to shareholder interests. 
The manager’s apparent risk tolerance turns on the relative weight 
she is likely to give to the interests of each investor class.  In the extreme 
case it will be relatively easy to figure out.  Imagine a self-interested 
manager who works for a salary of $1 per year and values the perquisites 
of office at $0.  If she owns $1 million of stock and holds no debt-like 
interests, then she will exhibit the risk-seeking tendency associated with 
the shareholders.  And likewise she will pursue a risk-averse strategy if 
the $1 million is tied up in a deferred compensation plan.
39
  In the run-of-
the-mill case, though, the puzzle is intractable.  The typical manager 
holds a combination of equity and debt-like interests, perhaps weighted 
toward equity.
40
  But she also enjoys the financial and other privileges of 
tenure.  It might be possible to determine a manager’s optimal strategy if 
one had complete information, including knowledge of the manager’s 
subjective assessment of the firm’s prospects and its investors’ 
idiosyncratic characteristics.  On that I am agnostic.  The thesis here is 
less ambitious.  It is that in most cases where a firm faces financial 
distress, theory furnishes little predictive power about the kind of 
investment strategies the firm’s management will be inclined to pursue 
absent the threat of legal intervention. 
This ambiguity is of central concern when thinking about how legal 
                                                 
 38.  I have assumed throughout that the firm’s investors are privately risk-neutral.  There may 
be reason to doubt whether the assumption is a plausible one for executive officers.  A rich literature 
of executive compensation assumes that executives, unable fully to diversify their investment in the 
firm, will exhibit risk-averse tendencies.  See Joseph G. Haubrich, Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, 
and the Principal-Agent Problem, 102 J. POL. ECON. 258, 267 (1994).  On the other hand, some 
studies suggest that corporate executives, like politicians, are risk seekers across a number of 
domains.  See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive 
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 18 (1993) (“[S]tudies of individual choice have 
shown that managers, like other people, are risk-seeking in the domain of losses.”).   
 39.  Even in this unlikely hypothetical, the manager’s strategy is perhaps uncertain.  To the 
extent manager A’s decisions can be reversed by a subsequent manager B—after A has been fired—a 
strategy of partial appeasement could be optimal. 
 40.  See M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when 
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1548–57 (2007) (reporting that in public 
companies, up to half of CEO compensation is in the form of equity). 
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rules might encourage managers to seek the social good, a question to 
which Part IV is addressed.  It is worth pausing here, however, to note 
that the manager most likely to maximize a firm’s value is the manager 
who weighs the interests of investor classes equally.  This manager has 
the following profit identity: 
 
(9)                  . 
 
Substituting equations (5) and (6) for the shareholder and creditor 
profit identities, respectively, yields the following equation after cross 
multiplying and modestly simplifying: 
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because   ̅̅ ̅= A0 + μ and E0 = A0 – P0.  Simplifying reveals a profit 
equation in which risk plays no part: 
 





A manager who weighs shareholder and creditor interests equally 
acts risk neutrally.  She maximizes her expected profit by maximizing 
the social value of the firm’s projects. 
III. VALUE MAXIMIZATION AS A LEGAL IDEAL 
In a laissez faire world, management resolution of vertical investor 
conflict is ambiguous.  The value of legal intervention, then, depends in 
the first instance on the ideal the law seeks.  This is clear enough.  Every 
legal intervention generates costs, and its utility therefore turns on the 
degree to which it encourages social behavior.  Suppose, for example, 
that in the face of vertical investor conflict the law wants managers to 
use corporate assets for their own interests first and foremost, subject to 
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explicit limitations imposed by statute or contract.
41
  It is hard to imagine 
a doctrine of intervention serving any purpose.  Yet another rule may 
better achieve different resolution.  The question in this Part is what 
norm, what ideal, of managerial behavior the law seeks when the 
interests of a firm’s investors conflict.  It argues that our law asks 
managers to maximize the value of firm assets to investors as a group, 
and that the law does so through the synthesis of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty (owed to shareholders) and fraudulent transfer principles (owed 
to creditors). 
It will be helpful to note at the outset that the managerial problem 
arises only because of incomplete contracting.
42
  To the extent explicit 
investment contracts direct the manager to do one thing or another, 
ordinary contract principles furnish easy answers.  And as we have seen, 
a variety of explicit promises typically restrict managerial freedom in the 
modern business organization.
43
  Yet inevitably managers enjoy a residue 
of discretion, sometimes more and sometimes less.  Expert judgment in 
the use of this residual authority justifies managerial salaries, and 
without residual authority there would be no need for incentive-based 
payments.  Managers could be paid like administrators.  That, of course, 
is not our world.  Managers in fact enjoy wide latitude in their 
deployment of firm assets.  The concern here is the standard of judgment 
by which managers should exercise whatever residual discretion they 
hold. 
There is a large body of literature—statutory, judicial, and 
scholarly—on this most important question of corporate governance.  
Courts and scholars have generally assumed that the answer lies in the 
definition of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and this Part begins with a 
brief survey and evaluation of the conclusions they have reached.  
Traditionally, fiduciary duties have been understood to run in favor of 
shareholders and shareholders only, suggesting that a manager is 
permitted, even obliged, to ignore creditor interests (including suppliers, 
employees, and other creditor-like constituencies).  This Part then argues 
that singular focus on fiduciary duty is misguided.  Debtor-creditor law 
has much to say about managerial norms.  In particular, this Part argues, 
                                                 
 41.  Cf. Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1315–16 (arguing that no residual legal duty ought 
to run from managers to their firms or investors, but rather that they “should merely be obliged to 
honor the terms of the firm’s investment contracts, even when they lead to decisions that are not 
value-maximizing ex post for the investors as a group”). 
 42.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 90–108. 
 43.  See supra Part II.B.  
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fraudulent transfer principles suggest that a value-maximization norm 
underlies existing law. 
A. Competing Visions of the Duty of Loyalty 
The traditional understanding of fiduciary duty is well illustrated by 
the canonical case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.
44
  The case turned on 
Henry Ford’s plan to reinvest Ford Motor Company’s profits in 
additional factories rather than pay a special dividend to the firm’s 
shareholders.  Whether expansion would ultimately benefit the 
shareholders was not Ford’s main concern.  He explained that under his 
direction Ford’s mission would be to provide work and inexpensive cars 
to an undifferentiated labor class that had no legal claim on the 
company’s assets.  In the suit brought by objecting shareholders, the 
court held that Ford’s plan was inconsistent with his fiduciary obligation.  




The managerial ideal described in Dodge and similar cases is that of 
shareholder-wealth maximization.
46
  Not every decided case is consistent 
with the rule, of course,
47
 but it is a fair approximation to say that 
shareholder-wealth maximization has been the traditional, direct aim of 
the duty of loyalty.
48
  Dodge pitted the interests of shareholders against 
the interests of a generalized labor force or class of society; it did not 
specifically address the conflict between vertically differentiated 
investors.
49
  But a number of cases out of Delaware and other important 
                                                 
 44.  170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 45.  For a detailed account and competing interpretation of Dodge, see M. Todd Henderson, 
Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., University of Chicago Law 
& Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 373 (2007), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/373.pdf. 
 46.  See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 681–82. 
 47.  See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (dismissing derivative suit in 
which shareholders claimed directors acted negligently by failing to install lights at Wrigley Field in 
order to hold profitable weekday night games).  Shlensky undoubtedly represents a minority view.  It 
may be best understood as a decision anticipating nuisance liability or proto-liability.  
 48.  See Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 607, 609 
(2007) [hereinafter Tung, Insolvency] (“Under the well-known shareholder primacy rubric—long 
dominant among courts and commentators—directors’ fiduciary duties run exclusively in favor of 
the corporation’s common shareholders, and duty requires the board to maximize shareholder 
returns.”); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director 
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 766 (2008) (“[I]n 
Delaware, the directors’ duties to stockholders must trump their concerns for other constituencies.”). 
 49.  See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670–71.  
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States have subsequently made the connection explicit.
50
  On the 
traditional view, managers deciding how to employ firm assets ought to 
privilege the common shareholders over competing constituencies. 
In 1991, Delaware’s Court of Chancery took up the question of 
vertical investor conflict explicitly in Credit Lyonnais.
51
  As in Dodge, 
the plaintiffs in Credit Lyonnais alleged that management had violated its 
duty of loyalty by choosing a course of action that preferred a 
constituency (creditors, in this case) over shareholders.
52
  Chancellor 
Allen refused to intervene, holding that when a firm is in the vicinity of 
insolvency, creditors are a part of the “community of interests” that 
managers can and should consider.
53
  The decision appeared to create a 
regime in which the direction of fiduciary duties shifts with the degree of 
a firm’s solvency. 
Even before, but especially in the years following Credit Lyonnais, 
scholars have posed a variety of normative criticisms of Delaware 
fiduciary duty doctrine.  One branch of criticism has defended a 
shareholder-wealth maximization principle on normative grounds.
54
  
Reasons have varied.  Some commentators have advanced a quasi-
metaphysical argument that equity holders, unlike other investors, “own” 
the firm in some intangible sense.
55
  Others have argued that the 
                                                 
 50.  E.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988) (“[A] convertible debenture 
represents a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a debt and does not represent an equitable 
interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with 
concomitant fiduciary duties.”); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1108.10 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) (“Outside of bankruptcy, the traditional rule is that so long as 
a corporation is solvent, the obligations of its officers and directors, including the duties of care and 
loyalty, run to stockholders, not creditors.”). 
 51.  Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 1991 
WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 52.  Id. at *1154. 
 53.  Id. at *1155–57. 
 54.  See Bainbridge, Defense, supra note 6, at 1446–47 (asserting that a rule favoring 
shareholder interests “has helped produce an economy that is dominated by public corporations, 
which in turn has produced the highest standard of living of any society in the history of the world”); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 547, 605–06 (2003) (arguing that director primacy in decision-making can be reconciled 
with shareholder wealth-maximization); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado about Little? Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335, 355 (2007) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Much Ado] (arguing that traditional allegiance to shareholders is preferred because 
responsibility to a larger constituency leads directors to primarily pursue self-interest); Hu & 
Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1402–03 (calling for abolition of duty-shifting doctrine); Tung, 
Insolvency, supra note 48, at 625–26 (arguing that extending fiduciary duties to creditors, at least to 
sophisticated bank lenders, would be counterproductive). 
 55.  Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1323. 
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shareholder-wealth maximization is a contractual term that should be 
honored like any other.
56
  Still others have argued on efficiency grounds 
or for psychological reasons that managers should exercise their 
discretion exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.
57
 
Another branch of criticism has sought a norm antithetical to the 
traditional, shareholder-centered norm.  Recognizing that risk-shifting 
threatens appropriation by shareholders of creditor wealth, and that the 
risk of appropriation increases the cost of raising capital through debt, 
commentators in this vein have argued for a strong rule of creditor 
protection.  In short, they argue that managers should pursue shareholder 
welfare through increasing the risk of corporate projects only when doing 
so would not diminish expected creditor recoveries—only when, in other 
words, increasing risk is Pareto optimal among the firm’s investors.
58
 
Yet, another school favors managers over either shareholder or 
creditor constituencies.  In a recent article, Douglas Baird and Todd 
Henderson argued that courts should forget about fiduciary duty 
altogether.
59
  Managers must honor explicit contracts, they argue, but 
courts should be out of the business of second-guessing decisions by 
reference to the implicit contract known as fiduciary duty.
60
  In practical 
terms, this argument amounts to a rule that managers should do what 
benefits them within the limits of explicit contracts.
61
  In the language of 
Part II, the manager is justified in maximizing her own profit equation 




In another light, this pro-management approach can be understood as 
                                                 
 56.  Bainbridge, Much Ado, supra note 54, at 337. 
 57.  Viral V. Acharya, Yakov Amihud & Lubomir Litov, Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-
Taking, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 150, 152 (2011) (proposing that strong creditors’ rights in default may 
lead to inefficient liquidation and hurt shareholder value); Bainbridge, Defense, supra note 6, at 
1427 (discussing Milton Friedman’s assertion that managers steal from shareholders when placing 
non-shareholder interests above equity interests); Tung, Insolvency, supra note 48, at 609 (claiming 
that sophisticated creditors can more efficiently control manager behavior by contract, rather than 
through the judicial system). 
 58.  E.g., McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 7, at 449–50 (1986); McDaniel, 
Stockholders, supra note 7, at 222 (1988).  McDaniel argues on behalf of bondholders in particular, 
but his argument seems to apply with equal force to creditors in general. See also David Millon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 226 (1991) (exploring the implications of director-
duty statutes that expand directors’ obligations to non-shareholders). 
 59.  Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1315–16. 
 60.  Id. at 1327–28.  
 61.  See id. (arguing for a rule that imposes on managers a fiduciary duty to the corporation as a 
whole through a “contractarian” approach). 
 62.  See id. 
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stating an argument about the deficits of judicial intervention rather than 
about the ideal toward which law would have managers strive.
63
  And in 
this sense Baird and Henderson are probably nearest the attitude of 
Delaware’s courts.  In decisions since Credit Lyonnais, its chancery and 
supreme courts have explained that the “shifting” managerial duties 
Chancellor Allen described are not meant to give creditors standing to 
challenge corporate decisions; they are rather a justification on which 
management can rely in defense to shareholder suit.  Managers can 
invoke their fiduciary obligation to creditors as a shield against 
shareholder challenges; but creditors, lacking any definite weight of 
consideration, cannot use the obligation as a sword.
64
  The Credit 




In any event, it should be clear that every conceivable constituency 
has at least an advocate or two among the academy.  There are 
commentators who in turn would privilege shareholders, creditors, and 
managers.  Yet the functional importance of the fiduciary rule is not 
immediately obvious.  One can think of each competing rule as 
bestowing a property right on its favored constituency, namely the right 
to choose (or veto) corporate projects.  The Coasean insight is clear: 
absent transaction costs, the choice of rule will not influence the ventures 
a hypothetical firm pursues.
66
 
Imagine a firm presented with a possible new project.  The project 
entails high risk and has negative expected social value.  In expectation 
and relative to the status quo, it is worth $5 to shareholders, $1 to the 
manager, and will cause creditors to lose $10.  Irrespective of the 
constituency holding the property right, the firm operating in a 
frictionless world will not pursue the new project.  If shareholders hold 
the right, creditors will pay between $6 and $10 to persuade the 
shareholders to forego it; likewise if the manager has the prerogative.  
                                                 
 63.  See id. at 1323 (stating that the business judgment rule is an “awkward tool for giving 
directors the legal guidance they need to make good decisions”).  
 64.  Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that 
the Court would be loath to choose between plausibly risky (pro-shareholder) and safe (pro-creditor) 
strategies); see also N. Am. Catholic Edu. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
99–101 (Del. 2007) (ratifying Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004)); 
Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1310–15. 
 65.  See Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 789–90. 
 66.  The Coase Theorem can be stated as follows: if both parties know the rule of law when 
they act, the economic result is the same regardless of the legal outcome.  Coltman v. Commissioner, 
980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992). 
  
28 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
And if creditors hold the right, then—unsurprisingly—they will decline 
the project because the $6 that the shareholders and managers jointly 
would pay to pursue the project is less than the loss the creditors would 
expect to suffer.  In any case, the firm will pursue the strategy that is 




There is no frictionless world, of course.  Transaction costs are likely 
to be relatively small in the context of a close firm, a point to which Part 
IV will return, but informational asymmetries between management and 
investors are chronic even where bargaining costs are low.  Still, the 
thought experiment suggests another possible norm of management 
behavior in the face of vertical investor conflict—that the manager 
should pursue that course which maximizes the value of the firm’s assets 
to the investors as a whole.  One can think of the asset-value-
maximization norm as casting a veil of ignorance over corporate law.  
This is by no means a novel suggestion.  Economists and legal scholars 
influenced by a contractarian approach to corporate law have lobbied in 
its favor for some time.
68
 
An asset-value-maximization norm has much to commend it on 
normative grounds.  Fundamentally, it directs assets to their socially 
optimal use.  In contrast to proposals for a “shifting” norm, asset-value 
maximization also eliminates discontinuity in managerial responsibility.  
Vertical investor conflict is described by a continuous function.  Discord 
increases continuously as a firm’s debt-to-assets ratio grows.  There is 
little reason to create a discontinuity and the attendant risk of strategic 
game-playing.  To be sure, firms and their investors regularly agree to 
create discontinuities by contract, and some discontinuities turn on the 
firm’s financial condition.  Yet it is hard to fathom an argument for such 
contractual discontinuity if managers’ good-faith application of an asset-
value-maximization norm can be assumed.  Covenants creating 
discontinuity are, in other words, responses to perhaps rational fears that 
creditors will not have practical recourse against managerial infidelity. 
 A full-throated normative defense of asset-value maximization is 
                                                 
 67.  Because investment is contractual, the rule would not even have distributional 
consequences. 
 68.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 217–18 (arguing that rational investors engaged in a 
hypothetical bargain “would agree to a norm that told managers to maximize the value of the 
diversified portfolios that CAPM says rational investors would hold”).  Baird and Henderson in fact 
describe this view as dominant among law-and-economics scholars.  See Baird & Henderson, supra 
note 9, at 1313–14. 
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beyond this Article’s scope.
69
 The purpose here is descriptive.  Those 
who have championed an asset-value maximization norm have done so 
aspirationally, assuming uncritically that a change in state fiduciary law 
would need to instantiate the norm.  The discussion below aims to show 
that myopic focus on fiduciary duty doctrine has clouded the debate over 
a more general managerial obligation and that, to put the point clearly, 
asset-value maximization is already the principle toward which our law 
seeks to direct managers. 
B. A Theory of Fraudulent Transfer 
This Part’s central contention is that the principles of fraudulent 
transfer point in the direction of an existing asset-value maximization 
norm.  The role of fraudulent transfer in corporate governance has been 
almost entirely neglected.  Why this is so is something of a mystery.  In 
part, it may be a result of historical classifications.  The law of fiduciary 
obligation has always fallen under the rubric of a firm’s “internal 
affairs.”
70
  For corporations, the law of the firm’s state of incorporation 
governs the scope and application of fiduciary duty;
71
 for partnerships, 
the law of the state in which the partnership is made.
72
  In particular, the 
courts of equity traditionally policed the boundaries of fiduciary 
obligation in the corporate context.  Thus scholars and other thoughtful 
lawyers have overwhelmingly focused on the jurisprudence of the 
Delaware courts of chancery.
73
  Fraudulent transfer, on the other hand, 
developed first as part of the criminal law and, later, as an exception to 
general rules of property transfer and ownership.
74
  Courts have never 
understood fraudulent transfer claims as falling within the internal affairs 
                                                 
 69.  For a thorough defense, see Smith, supra note 8. 
 70.  See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 72 (2013) (“The internal affairs doctrine 
applies to such matters as . . . fiduciary obligations to the corporation . . . .”). 
 71.  Total Holdings USA, Inc. v. Curran Composites, Inc., 999 A.2d 873, 884 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(“The internal affairs rule requires that the internal affairs of a corporation . . . are governed by the 
law of the corporation’s domicile.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See, e.g., Byron F. Egan, Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers in Texas, 
43-SPG TEX. J. BUS. L. 45, 179 (2009) (“Given the extent of Delaware case law dealing with 
director fiduciary duties, it is certain, however, that Delaware cases will be cited and argued by 
corporate lawyers negotiating transactions and handling any subsequent litigation.”). 
 74.  See Jon Travis Powers, Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act: For Statute of Limitations Purposes, Is Such Liability Grounded in Fraud or Created 
by Statute?, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4 Art. 5 (2011) (explaining the origins of fraudulent transfer 
law in The Statute of Elizabeth, a penal statute). 
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doctrine; the state in which the contested property is held has determined 
fraudulent transfer’s domain. 
Perhaps more importantly, fraudulent transfer has never received the 
theoretical attention that lawyers and scholars have lavished on the law 
of fiduciary duty.
75
  Since 1570, every Anglo-American jurisdiction has 
prohibited debtors from transferring assets with the intent to “hinder, 
delay or defraud” creditors.
76
  Following the courts’ lead, scholars have 
focused on describing and identifying “badges of fraud,” evidentiary 
markers that a fraudulent transfer has occurred.
77
  Few have asked the 
fundamental question—what about a transfer makes it likely to “hinder, 
delay or defraud.”
78
  What is it, in other words, that the badges of fraud 
are thought to signal?  Without a theory of fraudulent transfer, it should 
be no surprise that scholars and lawyers have generally ignored the 
doctrine’s implications for the norms of corporate governance.
79
  I 
suggest that attending to fraudulent transfer’s meaning will, in particular, 
yield valuable information about the way in which managers are meant 
to resolve vertical investor conflict. 
A theory of fraudulent transfer must start with Robert Clark, one of 
the few scholars who has sought to understand the theoretical principles 
                                                 
 75.  Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 505, 506 (1977) (asserting that identifying the purposes of fraudulent conveyance law is “a task 
sorely neglected in literally hundreds of cases applying that body of law”). 
 76.  The formulation dates to Parliament’s enactment of a criminal sanction. 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 5 
(Eng.). Every State in the United States has codified the prohibition through adoption either of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7 or its successor model statute, the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act § 4(a).  John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When a 
Claimant Doesn’t Have a Claim, When a Transfer Isn’t a Transfer, When Fraud Doesn’t Stay 
Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset Protection 
Planner, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 1049 (1997).  The Bankruptcy Code makes it federal law. 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 77.  See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. 58, 59 (2006) (enumerating 
traditional badges of fraud).  Responding to suits accompanying the rise of leveraged buyouts in the 
1980s, a handful of scholars also began to consider the application of a relatively recent doctrinal 
development, the “constructive” fraudulent transfer.  E.g., Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and 
Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781, 792 
(1988) (“[T]he constructive fraud provisions of the UFCA only apply to a limited category of debtor 
transactions which adversely affect creditors under certain circumstances of financial exigency.”); 
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 829, 830 (1985) (describing an approach that “presumes mischief when an insolvent 
debtor voluntarily transferred property and got nothing or clearly too little in return”). 
 78.  UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 378 (2006). 
 79.  See Clark, supra note 75, at 505 (noting, in the context of comparing fraudulent transfer 
with the doctrines of equitable subordination and veil piercing, “[t]he near absence of sustained 
discussion in cases or in the writings of commentators of the relationships among these branches of 
the law”). 
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of fraudulent transfer law.
80
  From his broad survey of fraudulent transfer 
case law, Clark divined what he called four “normative ideals of 
fraudulent conveyance law”: Truth, Respect, Evenhandedness, and 
Nonhindrance.
81
  Truth he explained as the principle that a debtor may 
not deceive his creditor in a manner that will lead to the impairment of 
the creditor’s claims.
82
  This ideal is closely related to, or perhaps even 
identical with, the familiar common law understanding of fraud—
deceptive acts the reliance on which will tend to harm another.  Thus a 
debtor may not lie about the assets he owns and which could be used to 
satisfy his debt in the event of nonpayment.  This norm is without doubt 
a part of fraudulent transfer law.  Indeed its connection with the 
traditional doctrine of fraud likely gave fraudulent transfer its name.  Our 
investigation is not mainly concerned with a manager’s deceptive acts, 
however, but rather with the kinds of dispositions a manager openly and 
honestly should choose.  Similarly Clark’s norm of Evenhandedness—
that a debtor should not prefer one creditor over another when the debtor 
is nearly insolvent—is of little present interest, whatever its general 
validity as a principle of fraudulent transfer law.
83
 
More important for present purposes are the ideals of Respect and 
Nonhindrance.  Respect stands for the principle that a debtor must give 
“primacy” to the interests of contract and tort creditors, “as opposed to 
the interests of self, family, friends, shareholders, and shrewder or more 
powerful bargaining parties.”
84
  Nonhindrance is a “vague” ideal 
prohibiting acts which make the creditor’s collection more difficult than 
it might otherwise be.
85
  In illustration, Clark says that Nonhindrance 
prohibits a debtor from converting liquid assets such as cash into illiquid 
assets more difficult to attach.
86
 
Taken at their limit these ideals have radical implications.  They 
would mean that a debtor is obliged to subordinate all affection for 
                                                 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 506.  Apart from quoted material, I follow the National Conference of 
Commissioners of Uniform State Law in using “fraudulent transfer” in place of the older phrase, 
“fraudulent conveyance.”  See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, Prefatory Note. 7A U.L.A. 5 
(2006). 
 82.  Clark, supra note 75, at 509. 
 83.  Id. at 512.  Whether Evenhandedness is a real principle of debtor-creditor law is arguable.  
Modern preference law may be thought to embody it, but one suspects that preference law is 
designed primarily to ward off the threat of kickback.  It is not necessary here to decide. 
 84.  Id. at 510–11. 
 85.  Id. at 513. 
 86.  Id. at 512–13. 
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himself or his family or, critical to modern corporate cases, for 
shareholders, to the interests of the creditor.
87
  Surely, though, this is not 
what the law of fraudulent transfer demands.  The question is in what 
kinds of situations a debtor must prefer his creditor over himself or other 
favored groups.  To answer this question, a return to first principles will 
be profitable.  Intuitions about base cases will do much to clarify the 
meaning of fraudulent transfer. 
Start with a simple case.  Suppose A is a shepherd.  He owns a flock 
of sheep worth $300 and owes his creditor, B, $200.  Hoping to stiff B, A 
decides to gift the sheep to his friend, C, leaving A insolvent and unable 
fully to satisfy B’s claim.  C, not being in the business of animal 
husbandry and because of his fondness for A, allows A to continue 
tending for the flock.  When B reduces his claim to judgment and directs 
the sheriff to levy on the sheep, A and C resist.  They contend that the 




These facts present a clear-cut case of fraudulent transfer.  B will be 
permitted to avoid the transfer and take possession.  All will agree on 
that.  But what is the wrong?  What about the gift hurts B?  Ordinarily 
the owner of property may dispose of it as he pleases.  Why not here? 
One view has it that the transfer is wrongful because it was secretly done.  
A continued in possession of the sheep after divesting himself of 
ownership, making it look as though he continued to hold valuable 
assets.  The problem is one of apparent ownership.  Had he not been 
deceived, B might have done more to protect the value of his claim.  The 
transfer is improper because it violates Clark’s ideal of Truth. 
The elegant simplicity of this view has sowed a great deal of 
confusion and has led some to take a very narrow view of fraudulent 
transfer, making it merely a species of fraud or misrepresentation.
89
  But 
                                                 
 87.  Such a rule would replicate the norm of creditor privilege. 
 88.  Students of debtor–creditor law will recognize this hypothetical as a slightly altered version 
of the facts of Twyne’s Case, (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber), the fountainhead of 
fraudulent transfer law and the origin of the badges of fraud.  On the reported facts of the real 
Twyne’s Case, the transferee was not only a friend but also a creditor of the transferor, making the 
transfer an example of what today would be known as a voidable preference rather than a fraudulent 
transfer.  Id at 810.  
 89.  Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1324 n.5 (arguing that corporate duties to creditors be 
limited to “constraints arising in contract and tort,” and thus excluding “fraudulent behavior” from 
discussion).  C.f. Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 600 (2005) (“The 
doctrine of ‘fraudulent conveyance’ has specific elements . . . that differ from normal usages of the 
word ‘fraud’ . . . .”). 
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in truth, the injury to B has little to do with deception.  To see this one 
need alter the facts only slightly.  Assume that B reduces his claim to 
judgment before A gifts the flock to C.  Assume even that A notifies B of 
the transfer and tells him that B’s judgment is the very reason for the 
transfer.  It matters not at all to B, who has his judgment in hand, whether 
A’s gift is secret or notorious.  A secret transfer might of course fool a 
potential subsequent lender, D, who naturally would gather that the sheep 
could be used to back any credit he might extend.  But for B that is 
neither here nor there.  B is upset only because the transfer has reduced 
the recovery he can expect to make on A’s assets.  A transfer need not be 
done in secret to be fraudulent. 
It might be tempting, then, to say that a transfer “hinders, delays, or 
defrauds” a creditor if it reduces the creditor’s expected recovery on his 
claim.  Yet fraudulent transfer will not cover such a vast set of cases.  
Suppose a shepherd, E, who in all respects is identical to A except that E 
has $100 in cash in addition to his flock.  E finds that he can use the cash 
to buy additional sheep.  He reasonably believes that, between his 
expertise and economies of scale, he can turn the $100 into sheep worth 
$110.  He also knows, of course, that sheep die—sometimes prematurely.  
Thus, there is a risk that his investment will evaporate.  But disease is 
reasonably uncommon.  E estimates less than a one-in-ten chance that a 
plague will strike his flock.  Taking the risk into account he expects a 
purchase to net $5.  As in the hypothetical above, however, the creditor B 
is unhappy about the prospect of more sheep.  If E holds the $100 in 
cash, B is certain he will be able to satisfy a judgment if E should fail to 
pay the interest due.  But if E converts legal tender into livestock, there is 
a ten percent chance the debt will be impaired.  Just as in the prototypical 
case of fraudulent transfer, E’s transfer—of cash, in this case—reduces 
B’s expected recovery on his claim.  The injury to B is the same.
90
  Yet 




This hypothetical suggests something that is missing from Clark’s 
account of fraudulent transfer.  According to Clark’s ideal of Respect, 
and perhaps too that of Nonhindrance, E’s purchase of additional sheep 
                                                 
 90.  The magnitude of the harm is less, but that is a consequence of the arbitrary numbers 
chosen to illustrate the cases. 
 91.  Of course the purchase would be a breach of contract if E had promised B not to dispose of 
his cash in this manner.  Covenants are enforceable.  But to get to the root of the problem of how a 
debtor may exercise his residual discretion, we should assume that B is a general creditor not owed 
any special right in this regard. 
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ought to be condemned.
92
  Recall that Respect stands for the idea that a 
debtor must give primacy to the claims of creditors over his own interests 
or the interests of his family, friends, or objects of charity.
93
  According 
to Clark, then, E should forget about buying sheep as soon as he realizes 
that to do so will reduce the value of B’s claim against him.
94
  That is the 
meaning of primacy.  One can see where the absolute nature of Clark’s 
vision leads.  If the creditor’s interest is to be preferred to that of the 
debtor, then the debtor ought to do whatever he can to maximize the 
creditor’s return, irrespective of the social costs (including the costs to 
himself).  It is a rule under which debtors can engage only in Pareto-
efficient transactions.  But fraudulent transfer requires no such thing.  It 
does not give creditors veto power over all debtor transactions. 
The distinction between these hypotheticals is the key to a credible 
theory of fraudulent transfer.  It is a simple distinction and one which 
shows Clark to be near the truth.  In both hypotheticals, the transfer 
reduced the value of B’s claim against the debtor.  The distinction is the 
expected effect of the transfers on the debtor’s wealth relative to their 
expected effect on the creditor’s wealth.  In the case of the gift of sheep, 
the expected value of A’s assets, to A, increased by an amount equal 
exactly to the expected impairment of B’s interest.
95
  In the case of the 
sheep purchase, on the other hand, the expected value of E’s assets, to E, 
increased by more than the diminution in value of B’s claim. 
The ideals of Respect and Nonhindrance must be restated.  A debtor 
need not prefer his creditor to himself, but nor can he prefer himself 
unless by so doing he increases the aggregate value of his assets to both 
himself and his creditor.
96
  Put differently, a transfer “hinders, delays or 
defrauds” an existing creditor if and only if it will reduce his existing 
creditor’s expected recovery without increasing the expected value to 
                                                 
 92.  Clark, supra note 75, at 510–11. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Presumably Clark would permit E to pay B the amount by which he thinks acquiring the 
sheep would impair B, in expectation.  In this sense Clark’s rule comes very close to, or is even 
identical with, the proposals to forbid debtors from taking any action which would not be Pareto 
superior.  Id. 
 95.  This assumes that A’s friend, C, will allow A to exercise effective right over the sheep—
i.e., without paying rent.  If C were to charge rent, the increased value to A of the sheep would be 
less than the decrease in their value to B.  
 96.  See Clark, supra note 75, at 511 n.19 (analogizing the ideal of Respect to a corporate 
director’s duty to “avoid abusive self-dealing and other conduct which puts his own interests, or that 
of a particular group of shareholders, above the interests of the shareholders as a whole”). 
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himself and his creditor, combined, of the debtor’s assets.
97
 
One caveat regarding creditor expectations is in order.  When a 
creditor implicitly or explicitly ratifies his debtor’s transfer of assets, the 
transfer is not fraudulent against him.  Suppose, for example, that our 
friend the shepherd is short on cash but sees an opportunity to turn a 
profit if only he could buy additional livestock.  He turns to B for a loan 
of the $50 he needs to make the purchase and explains what he hopes to 
do with the proceeds.  Now, however, the likelihood of disease is in 
some doubt.  It may be that the purchase of additional sheep is a negative 
expected-value proposition.  Buying the sheep, that is, might violate the 
rule just now stated—one cannot be sure.  Nevertheless, B will have no 
claim of fraudulent transfer.  The reason is that he knew of the purchase 
before he extended the loan.
98
  To the extent B believed it was a bad deal, 
he could have and should have—and probably did—charge an interest 
rate commensurate with the risk he saw in the enterprise.  A rule 




                                                 
 97.  Development during the twentieth century of the rule of “constructive” fraudulent transfer 
should be understood as an attempt to catch those transfers most obviously designed to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors in the sense here described.  Constructive fraudulent transfer prohibits the 
disposition of assets for less than reasonably equivalent value when the transferor is insolvent or 
nearly so.  E.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 129 (2006); See MSKP Oak 
Grove, LLC v. Venuto, 875 F. Supp. 2d 426, 438 (D.N.J. 2012) (showing how the judgment creditor 
properly alleged constructive fraudulent transfer under New Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
based on corporation’s distributions to shareholders near insolvency).  The reader will recall the 
significance of the debtor’s being near insolvency.  It is when the debtor is financially strapped that 
he will be most inclined to pursue negative-value propositions that offer hope of a big payout.  State 
laws prohibiting corporate distributions to shareholders in similar circumstances serve the same 
purpose.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 170 (2012) (permitting issuance of dividends only when 
a surplus exists).  
 98.  See Clark, supra note 75, at 511 (explaining that a transfer does not violate the ideal of 
Truth when the transaction is “fully and truthfully described”). 
 99.  As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Code creates an unfortunate 
exception upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.  Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).  The Code 
allows the trustee to avoid transfers as though he were a hypothetical creditor without knowledge of 
or acquiescence in the transfer, and directs him to share the proceeds of any recovery ratably 
according to the priority of allowed claimants’ claims.  11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2012).  This rule is 
indifferent to the fact that two creditors may have starkly different justifications in challenging a 
debtor’s transfer as fraudulent.  It permits double recovery for creditors who advanced funds 
knowing of the challenged transfer and leaves in the cold those who did not.  Thus I join the chorus 
of commentators who reject the doctrine of Moore.  See Douglas J. Whaley, The Dangerous 
Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 82 TEX. L. REV. 73, 74 (2003) (“The villain is the doctrine of Moore v. 
Bay, which . . . allows the bankruptcy trustee to assume the rights of the [unsecured creditors] . . .  
and then to improve their priority position by fitting into it all claims filed in the [debtor’s] 
bankruptcy proceeding, thus exhausting the value of the collateral and squeezing out the junior 
perfected creditors.”). 
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Let us return to the question of how a manager ought to dispose of 
firm assets in the face of vertical investor conflict and ask what 
fraudulent transfer teaches.  As we have seen, the traditional account of 
fiduciary duty asks the manager to maximize the return of assets to the 
firm’s shareholders.
100
  When the firm is financially healthy, this means 
finding projects that increase the expected value of the firm’s assets.  But 
when the firm is financially distressed—when its debt-to-assets ratio 
approaches 1—the manager can maximize shareholder returns through 
projects that entail negative expected value but also a high variance of 
returns.  This is the lesson of Part II.  Fraudulent transfer doctrine 
constrains the manager.  Another way to put the point is to say that the 
shareholder-wealth maximization norm is subject to the constraint of 
fiduciary duty.  The manager must seek to maximize shareholder returns 
subject to the rule that he may not accomplish this aim by reducing the 
net expected value of the assets to the shareholders and creditors 
combined.  In other words, the manager may seek to profit shareholders 
only by undertaking positive expected-value projects.  In choosing 
between two mutually exclusive projects, one with a high expected value 
that, because of the variance of its payouts, will impair creditors, and one 
that is safe but with a low expected value, the manager can and should 
choose the high-risk, high-value project. 
The logic implies a reciprocal rule.  Suppose now that the high-value 
project is also the safe one and that the low-value project would benefit 
shareholders only because of its risk properties.  Fraudulent transfer 
forbids the manager from choosing the risky, low-value project.  The 
manager must in this case choose the project favored by the creditors.  
The synthesis of the two rules states an ideal of asset-value 
maximization.  The manager ought to employ the firm’s assets in a way 
that maximizes their aggregate value to all the firm’s investors—
shareholders and creditors. 
One could object that fraudulent transfer touches only transfers and 
never condemns the status quo.  Fraudulent transfer, that is, never 
obliges a debtor firm actively to do anything with its assets.  The firm 
need not reduce the risk its operations entail just because a higher-value 
project is available.  Although such an action-inaction distinction is well 
taken on formal grounds, it cannot have much to say about the world of 
                                                 
 100.   Bo Becker & Per Strömberg, Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts, 25 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1931, 1931 (2012).  See also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
(extending directors’ fiduciary duty only to shareholders). 
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modern business.  In the business world there is formally speaking no 
status quo.  The most routine operations are accomplished through 
countless “transfers” within the meaning of any conveyance law. 
The skeptical reader will notice another question of baseline, one that 
at first glance appears more sophisticated.  Suppose that a highly 
leveraged firm faces three mutually exclusive possibilities.  First, it may 
pursue its status quo portfolio of projects.  Second, it can undertake a 
project that in expectation promises to net the firm $10 more than the 
status quo but that will entail a high variance of possible returns.  Third, 
the firm can choose a project that guarantees $15 more than the status 
quo portfolio.  It should by now be clear enough that the firm’s manager 
is obliged to do something other than the status quo.  But must he choose 
the third (highest value) project?  Our discussion of fraudulent transfer 
concluded that a debtor is permitted to impair creditor interests if in so 
doing the debtor increases the expected value of its assets.
101
  If the 
appropriate baseline is the status quo, then the second project is 
acceptable, and, according to our traditional statement of fiduciary duty, 
the manager should choose it if it maximizes the shareholders’ expected 
return.  But suppose the manager in fact chooses this high-variance 
project.  Now the low-value, high-risk project becomes the status quo.  
The problem dissolves into the binary choice described above.  Setting 
aside the action-inaction distinction, the manager will be obliged to trade 
up, so to speak, to the highest-value project. 
 
* * * 
 
In the real world, of course, the expected values of a firm’s 
opportunities are difficult or perhaps impossible to determine with 
precision.  It is even doubtful to what extent an outsider can know what 
opportunities the firm realistically has.  The law’s response has been to 
defer in most cases to the judgments of a firm’s management.  When 
shareholders sue and assert a violation of fiduciary obligation, this 
discretion is known as the business judgment rule.  When a creditor 
objects to a firm’s disposition of assets on a theory of fraudulent transfer, 
discretion is embodied in the rule that the creditor must prove intent to 
delay, hinder, or defraud.  By definition, deference means that often law 
will not discipline a manager who flouts the asset-value-maximization 
                                                 
 101.  See supra notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text. 
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norm. 
This Part has aimed to abstract from the real world—to forget for a 
moment the evidentiary burdens and presumptions that color real-world 
litigation—and to discern what the law directs a conscientious manager 
to do.  Undoubtedly most managers care what the law says, just because 
it is law, about how they ought to exercise their discretion.  Anyone who 
stops at red lights in the middle of the night will understand why.  And 
empirical work suggests that manager behavior does in fact change when 
the standard of conduct to which they are held changes, even when the 
threat of successful challenges in litigation is held constant.
102
  Think of 
this as a function of law’s expressive value. 
Expressive value is only a part of the matter, though.  Business 
managers are no saints.  Accepting that managers will inevitably enjoy 
some latitude because of the real-world limitations of courts (and the 
costs of judicial intervention),
103
 one needs to ask whether an 
interventionist program is justifiable; and, if so, under what conditions. 
IV. THE PROSPECT OF LEGAL INTERVENTION 
The lesson of Parts II and III can be summarized neatly.  The law 
asks a firm’s manager to resolve vertical investor conflict by pursuing 
projects likely to maximize the expected value of the firm’s assets to 
shareholders and creditors combined.  In some circumstances, asset-
value maximization will be the manager’s natural aim.  When the 
manager’s private profit identity is equally weighted between 
shareholder and creditor interest, she will seek value-maximizing 
projects without any legal intervention.
104
  But with anything short of a 
complete theory of human behavior, one can estimate the manager’s 
profit identity with only very limited accuracy.  It is safe to presume that 
the manager will be inclined to a more risk-neutral strategy than either 
the firm’s shareholders or its creditors will be, but it is not obvious 
                                                 
 102.  See Becker & Strömberg, supra note 100, at 1932–34 (showing changes in managerial 
behavior in firms near insolvency following Credit Lyonnais).  Credit Lyonnais told managers to 
consider creditor as well as shareholder interests “in the vicinity of insolvency,” but it did not 
articulate any standard by which creditors might enforce this new obligation.  Nevertheless, Becker 
and Strömberg have identified significant changes in firm behavior after Credit Lyonnais.  In 
particular, they found that firms reduced risk, increased leverage, and relied less on explicit 
covenants.  Id.  
 103.  See Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1313 (discussing the inability of courts to easily or 
effectively determine the legality of a director’s actions).  
 104.  See supra Part II.B. 
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except in the extreme case whether the manager will pursue a risk-
seeking or a risk-averse strategy.  That is, it is not obvious as a matter of 
theory whether the manager’s deviation from the legal norm is more 
likely to state a case of fiduciary slack or fraudulent transfer.  In 
particular, the existence of a dissatisfied shareholder or creditor class 
reveals little about the degree to which the manager has departed from 
the risk-neutral attitude the law directs.  Inasmuch as the manager’s 
apparent risk tolerance will generally be intermediate, one should expect 




A costless mechanism to enforce asset-value maximization would 
reduce managerial bonding costs as well as the monitoring costs of both 
debt and equity.  It would thus decrease firms’ total cost of capital.  But 
if the most one can say of managerial incentives is that they are 
ambiguous, it is natural to ask how law could possibly ameliorate vertical 
investor conflict at acceptable cost.  Litigation is expensive.  Without a 
stable presumption about the direction in or degree to which management 
is likely to depart from the value-maximizing norm, litigation would 
seem to threaten significant error costs in addition to unavoidable 
administrative costs. 
Moreover, a coherent evaluation of law’s place in resolving vertical 
investor conflict depends on one’s view of capital markets’ relative 
efficiency.  Investors are well aware of conflicts between hierarchically 
differentiated capital suppliers.  Given the inherent costs of litigation, 
one must ask whether investors can solve conflicts more cheaply than 
courts.  And to the extent markets have eschewed an apparent resolution 
to the problem, one needs to ask why.  Solutions entail costs.  If the costs 
of eradicating an evident problem exceed the costs of the problem itself, 
then the solution is itself a new problem.  Indeed, decisions such as 
Credit Lyonnais and Gheewalla are probably best read as an implicit 
ratification of this skeptical view.  In directing managerial loyalty to a 
“community of interests,” Delaware has effectively denied that there is 
any particular metric by which courts can assess a manager’s deviation 
from the ideal, value-maximizing attitude.  Without a standard of 
evaluation, the business judgment rule takes on nearly insuperable 
proportions.  Laissez faire seems to be Delaware’s doctrine when it 
                                                 
 105.  Laura Lin pointed out this difficulty with respect to creditor challenges.  Lin, supra note 8, 
at 1509.  But for reasons that should by now be clear, a shareholder’s incentive to challenge value-
maximizing projects is equal to and reciprocal of a creditor’s. 
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comes to vertical investor conflict. 
But is it true that law is generally incapable of encouraging self-
interested managers to live up to the value-maximization ideal?  Broadly 
speaking, the law might seek to resolve vertical investor conflict through 
either ex ante or ex post regulation, or through a combination of both.  Ex 
ante regulation seeks to align the incentives of primary actors with the 
social good.  Here that means a strategy aimed at making investors and 
managers prefer asset-value maximizing projects.  Ex post regulation 
seeks the same end, but does so by threat of punishment for deviation 
from the ideal norm.  It is regulation by litigation.  This Part tentatively 
argues that ex ante legal intervention holds little promise.  With respect 
to litigation, this Part argues that Delaware’s skeptical attitude is well 
taken in the context of closely held firms, but that deference to 
management is less justified when investors in a public firm allege 
breach of fiduciary obligation or fraudulent transfer. 
A. Ex Ante Regulation 
1. Harmonizing Investor Incentives 
As we saw in Part II, vertical investor conflict is a function of limited 
liability and in particular the hierarchical nature of investors’ claims on 
firm assets.  One way in which law can resolve this conflict is through 
rules harmonizing investor profit identities.  Reducing the divergence of 
interest between shareholders and creditors reduces the effect of risk on 
the expected profit of each.  Reducing the effect of risk in turn reduces 
the investors’ incentives to lobby management for low expected-value 
projects that redound to the particular class’s advantage.  To take an 
extreme possibility, imagine that shareholders and creditors were made 
to internalize identical profit identities, in the case of a dual-class firm 
each class bearing half of the other’s losses.  This would solve vertical 
investor conflict outright because it would make the investors’ cash-flow 
rights identical. 
One example of a harmonizing rule found in our law is forced 
conversion.  In a bona fide Chapter 11 reorganization, the bankruptcy 
judge is empowered to convert a creditor’s prepetition debt interest in the 
debtor firm into an equity interest in the reorganized entity.
106
  If need be, 
                                                 
 106.   See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
bankruptcy court can consider whether to characterize a claim of debt as equity). 
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the bankruptcy judge can accomplish this through “cram down,”
107
 and 
thus negotiations during bankruptcy reflect the possibility of at least 
partial conversion.  Even before bankruptcy, therefore, the threat of 
conversion affects a rational creditor’s profit identity.  If the creditor 
thinks there is a 30 percent chance of conversion into equity tomorrow—
or, what comes to the same thing, if the creditor believes that 30 percent 
of his interest will be converted—then his own profit identity will reflect 
shareholders’ interests proportionally.  This creditor will be marginally 
less likely, pre-bankruptcy, to agitate for value-destroying safe projects.  
Commentators who advocate a loss “sharing” regime, rather than a 
presumption of liquidation and distribution according to state law 




But although robust conversion rules have the potential to eliminate 
vertical investor conflict, one should be wary of their place in debtor-
creditor law.  Conversion rules reduce conflict because they flatten a 
firm’s capital structure.  Creditors in a world of robust conversion are 
less likely to seek safe, low-value projects because they know that, at the 
end of the day, only a fraction of their priority will be respected.  
Shareholders in such a world know that they bear the residual interest 
only to a degree.  In terms of cash-flow rights, the investors become 
homogeneous; at the limit, they find themselves in a world of equity-only 
or debt-only firms. 
Yet notwithstanding vertical investor conflict and Modigliani and 
Miller’s famous riddle,
109
 capital markets continue to generate 
hierarchically differentiated capital structures.  Financial economists and 
legal scholars have identified a number of plausible explanations.  For 
one thing, hierarchical differentiation may optimize the monitoring of a 
firm’s management.
110
  It may, in other words, reduce managerial self-
dealing by more than the expected cost of vertical investor conflict.  One 
has to be skeptical of legal rules that undermine the choices voluntary 
                                                 
 107.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012). 
 108.  E.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).  Interestingly, 
bankruptcy law is asymmetric in its appetite for conversion.  A creditor’s interest may be converted, 
but not a shareholder’s.  In other words, the bankruptcy judge cannot call on shareholders for 
additional capital—a forced “loan” that would to some degree force shareholders to internalize 
lenders’ losses. 
 109.  Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 268–69 (1958) (establishing the theory that a firm’s 
form of capital financing is irrelevant to its market value). 
 110.  See, Levmore, supra note 36, at 50.  
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investors make. 
To say that law has no place here is not to diminish the insight that 
conversion—indeed, even the possibility of conversion—reduces vertical 
investor conflict.  Financial economists have suggested that firms use 
convertible instruments for precisely this reason.
111
  This is a voluntary 
rather than mandatory conversion rule, but the incentive dynamic works 
similarly.  And indeed, empirical research suggests that financially 
troubled firms (in which vertical investor conflict is most acute) are more 
likely than others to issue convertible bonds.
112
  The point is rather that 
law with its one-size-fits-all tendency is unlikely to do better than private 
markets in creating optimal conversion rights. 
A different harmonizing rule would unify investor interests by 
forcing auction to a single buyer whenever a firm’s debt-to-assets ratio 
exceeds an identifiable threshold.
113
  Recall that the sole owner of assets 
maximizes his profit by maximizing asset value.
114
  In large measure, 
modern bankruptcy practice is devoted to this aim.  Whether through a 
section 363 sale or by the terms of a plan of reorganization, most Chapter 
11 proceedings are resolved by putting the debtor’s assets in the hands of 
a single, willing buyer.
115
  Even when a debtor firm does not sell all of its 
assets, it often sells a portion of them to generate cash, pay down debt 
claims, and thereby restore the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio to an 
                                                 
 111.  Jensen and Meckling were the first to see this.  According to their pathbreaking article, 
“[T]he addition of a conversion privilege to fixed claims such as debt or preferred stock would also 
tend to reduce the incentive effects of the existence of such fixed claims and therefore lower the 
agency costs associated with them.”  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 354.  See also Smith & 
Warner, supra note 28, at 140–42 (discussing Jensen and Meckling’s work and noting that not all 
debt contracts include a conversion privilege due to the accompanying expenses); but see M. P. 
Narayanan, On the Resolution of Agency Problems by Complex Financial Instruments: A Comment, 
42 J. FIN. 1083, 1087–88 (1987) (taking issue with the argument that conversion necessarily resolves 
vertical investor conflict). 
 112.  Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, Capital Structure and Debt Structure, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
4242, 4245 (2010); Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Case for Convertibles, 1 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 64 (1988). 
 113.  In many respects such a rule would serve the same purpose as minimum-capital 
requirements pervasive in the European Union. In the United States, however, minimum-capital 
rules are unrealistic outside heavily regulated industries such as banking and insurance. For a 
persuasive argument against the utility of minimum-capital rules, even if they were politically 
feasible, see Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case 
Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001).  
 114.  See supra Part II.A. 
 115.  See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
673, 679 (2003) (finding that in 2002 84% of Chapter 11 proceedings were asset sales or preexisting 
deals). 
  
2013] BEYOND INSOLVENCY 43 
acceptable level.
116
  One might describe Chapter 11 as standing for a de 
facto if not de jure mandatory-auction principle. 
For at least two reasons, though, one should hesitate at the prospect 
of a mandatory-auction rule.  First, asset sales collapse the option value 
inherent in the junior interests.
117
  One can think of an asset sale as a 
zero-risk investment, and thus as the kind of project for which creditors 
will agitate even (in some cases) where the assets’ value to the firm is 
greater than what the highest outside bidder will pay.  In a world of 
asymmetric information, this may often be the case.
118
  The concern is 
that investors in a mandatory-auction regime will act strategically on the 
margins near whatever debt-to-assets threshold the law might select.
119
  
Creditors, in particular, may perversely seek negative returns in the short 
run in order to activate the mandatory auction.  For their part, 
shareholders might seek short-run measures that decrease the firm’s 




To some degree capital markets appear willing to tolerate the 
perversion of incentives associated with a forced sale.  In many debt 
contracts, firms covenant not to allow their debt-equity ratio to grow 
beyond a stated threshold.  The creditor of a breaching firm then has the 
option to declare a default and force the firm into bankruptcy where an 
asset sale is likely.
121
  Again, though, one must ask why the law should 
intervene if investors are capable of crafting mandatory auction rules 
where they please.
122
  Here, the law’s inflexibility is of particular 
concern.  The degree to which vertical investor conflict will pose a real 
and not merely theoretical threat to the efficient use of assets will depend 
upon factors such as the firm’s size and the industry in which the firm 
operates.
123
  Investors can haggle over details.  A statute is, by contrast, a 
                                                 
 116.  Id. at 675–76, 691–93 (discussing the prevalence and role of asset sales in Chapter 11 
proceedings).  
 117.  Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 
11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 764–65 (2011).  
 118.  Id. at 788. 
 119.  See id. at 784–89 (discussing the conflicting interests of junior and senior creditors when 
the mandatory absolute priority rule is applied). 
 120.  Casey argues that bankruptcy can preserve option value in asset sales by relaxing the 
absolute-priority rule. Id. at 789–96.  Another approach, which I hope to specify in subsequent 
research, would require the sale of the investors’ interests rather than the firm’s assets. 
 121.  Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 115, at 679.  
 122.  See id. at 696.  
 123.  See id. 
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blunt tool indeed. 
2. Regulating Managerial Incentives 
A second approach to ex ante regulation focuses on managerial 
incentives.  As we have seen, a manager’s profit identity is a weighted 
average of the profit identities of the firm’s investors.  In a two-tranche 
firm such as Part II modeled, vertical investor conflict threatens to 
impose social costs only when the manager’s profit identity is not 
equally weighted between the interests of shareholders and creditors.  
Thus, a legal rule forcing managers to weigh investor interests 
proportionally to the size of their claims would alleviate the effects of 
investor conflict without seeking to harmonize the investors’ own 
incentives. 
The most obvious route is a legal rule mandating that compensation 
be tied to changes in the value of a firm’s assets (including assets taken 
out of corporate solution as dividends or to pay down debt).
124
  The idea 
entails obvious practical difficulties.  Firms are financed from many 
directions.  A firm may owe obligations on a bank loan (including 
revolving facilities under which the outstanding amount of debt 
fluctuates), multiple bond issues with varying maturities, trade debt with 
varying terms, employee contracts, and involuntary, sometimes 
contingent and uncertain, tax and tort claims, all in addition to, of course, 
equity.  Changes in financing would require firms continually to update 
compensation contracts.  The practical inconvenience may explain, in 
part, why we do not observe firms offering such detailed, tailored 
compensation packages.  But in any event, there is little reason to think 
law can achieve more in this regard than private markets can. 
In particular, law seems ill-suited to the heterogeneity of managerial 
preferences.  This Article has assumed throughout that investors and 
managers reveal symmetric tolerance for risk.  It has been a convenient 
assumption for purposes of exposition, but of course people in the real 
                                                 
 124.  See generally Baird & Henderson, supra note 9 (discussing contractual pay-setting for 
managers of firms in Chapter 11); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 352 (“If [the 
manager] binds himself contractually to hold a fraction of the total debt equal to his fractional 
ownership of the total equity he would have no incentive whatsoever to reallocate wealth from the 
debtholders to the stockholders.”).  Delayed compensation probably does this, as do pension plans.  
The idea is to make the manager a kind of “sole owner.”  If she has to internalize the costs 
shareholders’ preferences impose on debtholders, and vice versa, in proportion to the size of 
investment in each tranche, the manager ought to internalize the social cost of preferring any one 
group of investors. 
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world differ on this score.  Some scholars have theorized that managers 
are systematically risk-averse, relative to the suppliers of capital, when it 
comes to the firm’s activities.
125
  Unlike most passive investors, senior 
executives are expected and at times required to invest a substantial part 
of their personal wealth in the firm.  Diversification is more difficult, 
perhaps impossible, and consequently management may be inclined to 
reduce the variance of the firm’s prospects.  Others believe that the 
personality likely to rise to a position of senior management, at least in a 
big firm, tends toward the risk-seeking.
126
  There is no need here to take a 
position on which thesis is empirically correct, if either.  Whatever the 
average direction of managerial risk preferences, there is doubtless 
variation among particular managers.  If investors, in a given firm, 
believe that their CEO is a risk seeker, or is risk averse, they may want to 
tailor her compensation package to fit the facts.  Law’s cumbersome 
uniformity is not well adapted to deploy hunches or respond to subtle 
behavioral signals. 
 
* * * 
 
This discussion should suggest skepticism about the law’s ability, 
relative to that of capital markets, to resolve vertical investor conflict 
through ex ante regulation.  The reason is clear enough: wherever the law 
can furnish a workable ex ante rule, capital markets can do the same.  
And unlike the law, which because of administrative and decision costs 
tends to issue one-size-fits-all doctrines, investors in capital markets can 
tailor ex ante rules to fit the occasion.  The domain of investor conflict 
does not seem to be one in which an impartial regulator is better 
equipped than self-interested investors who are fully aware of the 
problem they face. 
B. Ex Post Regulation 
Ex post regulation seeks to discipline the manager, to force her to 
choose asset-value maximizing projects, by permitting investors to 
challenge the legality of her preferred projects.  It assigns decision-
making authority to managers in the first instance.  If, however, an 
investor can prove that the manager would have selected a different 
                                                 
 125.  See supra note 38.  
 126.  See supra note 38. 
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portfolio of projects had she acted with the risk-neutral attitude 
associated with socially optimal use of assets, a court may substitute its 
own judgment for that of the manager. 
As Part III showed, our law currently foresees a measure of this kind 
of ex post regulation.  Disaffected shareholders can seek to set aside 
managerial decisions in a suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty.  A 
successful claim entitles the shareholder plaintiff to injunctive relief, 
directing management to undertake the proper course of action, or else 
compensatory damages.
127
  Disappointed creditors have an analogous 
cause of action.  They can challenge managerial decisions in a fraudulent 
transfer suit against the debtor firm.  Here, too, courts are authorized to 
enjoin pending transactions or to set them aside after the fact.
128
 
We might think investor suits hold little promise of effectively 
regulating managerial incentives.  The manager’s profit identity is 
difficult to estimate in any given case, because of uncertainty about the 
relative weight she will give to shareholder and creditor interests.  
Investors and managers may differ in their estimation of the risks and 
rewards of various possible projects, a version of the “balance-sheet” 
conflict referred to in Part II.  Because it is difficult to estimate a 
manager’s profit identity in any given case, courts will often be unable to 
calibrate a prima facie view of the skepticism with which they evaluate 
the manager’s actions.  In other words, courts may find it hard to tell 
whether a manager has adopted a course of action out of favoritism 
toward a class of the firm’s investors or, rather, because of genuine belief 
that it is the asset-value maximizing strategy. 
Indeed, courts are well aware of this problem.  The deference they 
grant to managerial decisions reflects the difficulty.
129
  Yet it is worth 
asking whether deference is in all cases equally merited.  For firms 
whose securities are widely traded, market prices may provide valuable 
insight.  To see this, consider again the Acme hypothetical from Part II.  
Assume that Acme’s equity and debt are traded in liquid markets.  
Additionally, assume that the manager and investors know, or at least 
agree on, the payout possibilities of Acme’s three possible projects, but 
that a court is incapable of discovering the information directly.  At time 
                                                 
 127.  E.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003). 
 128.  UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 155 (2006). 
 129.  See, e.g., In re Citigroup S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“It is 
almost impossible for a court, in hindsight, to determine whether the directors of a company properly 
evaluated risk and thus made the ‘right’ business decision.”). 
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0, Acme’s equity is trading for E0 and its debt for P0.  Suppose first that 
the manager announces that Acme will pursue Project A.  Shareholders 
are elated.  The market reacts to the news by trading up the value of 
equity to E0 + $17.50.  The creditor, on the other hand, is disappointed.  
The market now prices his debt at P0 – $37.50.  If the creditor files suit 
on a fraudulent transfer theory, what result?  Consulting the price 
fluctuations, the court will see that Acme has reduced the creditor’s 
expected recovery without increasing the expected value of its assets to 
the investors as a group.  Before the announcement, the market valued 
Acme’s assets at E0 + P0.  Now it values them at E0 + P0 – 20.  This is a 
fraudulent transfer. 
Note that shareholders would hold a reciprocal and viable complaint 
if management selected Project B.  The claim would be described as a 
breach of the duty of loyalty.  Project C presents the interesting case.  If 
Acme pursues Project C, the market price of shareholders’ equity 
increases to E0 + $7.50.  The price of the creditor’s debt declines to P0 – 
$2.50.  Now what result if the creditor brings a fraudulent transfer 
action?  The answer is no liability.  As in the case of Project A, Acme has 
reduced the creditor’s expected recovery.  But it has done so by choosing 
a project that increases the total value of its assets.  The market now 
values Acme’s assets at E0 + P0 – 5.  The manager has made a proper 
decision. 
This hypothetical suggests a more general conclusion.  If liquid 
markets efficiently price each class of debt and equity a firm issues, then 
courts can get a rough sense of the merit of an investor’s suit by 
comparing prices before and after the announcement of a strategic 
initiative.
130
  If the price of the plaintiff’s investment has increased, there 
is no liability.  If the price of the plaintiff’s investment has decreased but 
the implied price of the assets as a whole has increased, there is no 
liability.  Only when the price of the plaintiff’s investment and the 
implied value of the firm’s assets have declined in value, but yet the 
value of another class of investment has increased, is there cause to think 
management favoritism is to blame.
131
  This is not to say liability would 
follow as a matter of course in such a case.  Maybe the manager has 
private information about the risks and rewards of the project she has 
                                                 
 130.  The court would of course have to extrapolate from market changes to estimate the price 
fluctuation of untraded investments such as trade debt and tort claims. 
 131.  C.f. Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1326 (suggesting the notion behind Credit 
Lyonnais is that a “fiduciary duty owed to shareholders should not prevent the directors from taking 
actions that were in the creditors’ interest and in the interest of the firm as a whole”). 
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selected, information necessarily not included in market prices.  But here 
at least the facts suggest that a deeper inquiry into the manager’s motives 
may be in order.  In a sense, market signals promise to reduce litigation 
costs by filtering meritless from potentially meritorious claims. 
Market signals may be valuable even where a court lacks access to 
the pricing of every class of investment.  The only crucial data is the 
firm’s equity and options on the same trade in a liquid market.  Option 
theory tells us that the value of an option depends on, among other 
things, the underlying asset’s volatility.
132
  Widely used pricing models 
such as Black-Scholes reveal the implied volatility of equity (the square 
of equity’s variance).
133
  Comparing the implied volatility of a firm’s 
equity before and after the announcement of a strategic initiative thus 
reveals the market’s evaluation of the change in its volatility attributable 
to the announced plan.  As Part II showed, shareholders’ and creditors’ 
profit identities depend on both the expected value of the firm’s projects 
and their variance.  A change in the price of equity reflects a change in 
(a) the expected value of the firm’s assets, (b) the expected variance 
inherent in the firm’s business, or (c) both.  Using an option pricing 
model to estimate variance, one can mechanically calculate whether, to 
what degree, and in what direction these factors contributed to changes in 
the value of an investment.  Deriving variance from changes in option 
prices is in some ways more complicated than direct observation.  But it 
would allow mathematically inclined courts to screen meritless cases 
where not all of a firm’s debt and equity trade in liquid markets. 
The skeptical reader may again object that this discussion assumes a 
stable baseline against which managerial decisions are to be judged.  
Suppose that a firm faces three possible strategic initiatives: the status 
quo and two alternatives, one of which entails high risk and one low risk.  
Although both of the alternative projects will in expectation increase the 
value of the firm’s assets relative to the status quo, one is more valuable 
than the other.  How, the skeptic might ask, will investor suits direct the 
manager toward the highest-value project?  Capital markets will in either 
case reflect an increase in the value of the firm’s assets, and thus, the 
                                                 
 132.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 343 (2002) 
(stating that an underlying asset’s “anticipated volatility” is one of several factors influencing the 
value of an option). 
 133.  See id. (“The Black-Scholes model simplifies the problem of estimating volatility . . . .”). 
See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 
J. POL. ECON.  637 (1973).  
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objection goes, courts would find liability in neither case.  The manager 
has free reign. 
The significance of the skeptic’s objection turns on one’s view of the 
efficiency of capital markets.  If market prices at time 0 do not accurately 
reflect the firm’s possible projects in addition to its status quo operations, 
then prices will only imperfectly signal managerial malfeasance.  Highly 
efficient markets price information quickly and accurately.  Anyone who 
watches the ticker tape after a firm announces quarterly results knows 
that markets do indeed price public information quickly.  It is less 
obvious that they price private information accurately.  Suppose a firm’s 
CEO is considering whether to undertake a project, call it Y.  At the same 
time, she learns of a prospective business deal, Z, the firm could reach 
with another company.  Z would make the firm a handsome profit, in 
expectation, but it would also entail high risk.  Because her interests are 
roughly aligned with the interests of senior creditors, the CEO keeps 
quiet about Z and goes forward with the less profitable Y.  Or she may 
misrepresent her real views about Z’s profitability.  To the extent markets 
are bad at determining what possibilities are reasonably available, they 
will be relatively unhelpful to a court’s assessment of malfeasance in an 
investor suit. 
These are credible concerns.  It should be stressed that market data 
will not costlessly resolve investor suits.  They will not resolve vertical 
investor conflict perfectly.  Yet in the case of a firm with widely traded 
securities, market prices can tell us something about whether a manager 
has consciously changed the firm’s risk profile, and whether the change 
is likely to have increased or decreased the expected value of the firm’s 
assets. 
The close firm presents a less sanguine view of the promise of 
judicial intervention.  By definition, investments in a close firm are not 
widely traded.  Courts do not have access to the opinions disinterested 
market watchers hold on the nature of managerial decisions.  The say-so 
of interested investors is the best evidence a judge will realistically hear.  
We have seen that a manager’s risk appetite at a given time is likely to be 
greater than a creditor’s but less than a shareholder’s.  The manager’s 
choice of projects will tend to entail too much risk for the creditor but too 
little for the shareholder.  Both classes of investor could gripe.  Indeed, in 
a distressed firm, socially optimal investments satisfy neither shareholder 
nor creditor.  The existence of dispute then says nothing about whether 
and to what extent a manager has deviated from the decisional ideal our 
law supplies.  Short of damning documentary evidence, courts will find it 
difficult to figure what exactly caused a manager’s decision.  In a close 
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firm, ex post regulation through investor suits seems an unhelpful way to 
resolve investor conflict. 
On the other hand, the deleterious social effects of conflict are 
perhaps less significant in a close firm.  The investors in a close firm are 
fewer in number than investors in a public corporation.  They are also 
likely on average to know more about the firm’s business.  The 
freeriding problem is smaller and hence the returns to active monitoring 
are greater.  In this sense the close firm approaches a rough description 
of Coase’s utopia.  Holdout and freerider problems are small, as are the 
costs of negotiation.  Information asymmetries are few and far between.  
The investors can cheaply negotiate with one another or bribe 
management.  Their ex post dickering predictably ends with the firm 
putting its assets to their best use.  Thus, as in so many places, Coase 
comes to the rescue when the situation appeared most dire. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Vertical conflict is not a sign of perverse or idiosyncratic investor 
behavior.  On the contrary, it is a product of rational self-interest in the 
presence of limited liability.  Wherever investor claims to a firm’s assets 
are hierarchically organized, vertical investor conflict should be expected 
and socially suboptimal use of assets should be feared.  The question is 
what, if anything, law has to say about the way in which managers 
resolve the conflict. 
This Article has aimed to show that our law has much to say, at least 
when it comes to articulating ideals toward which managers should 
strive.  The combined lesson of fraudulent transfer doctrine and the duty 
of loyalty, as traditionally framed, is that a manager ought to seek 
strategies that maximize the expected value of her firm’s assets.  This is a 
descriptive take on the law, but it has the happy consequence of 
mirroring the rule that most economists believe investors would agree to 
in a hypothetical, ex ante negotiation.  In this sense, asset-value 
maximization can be understood as a default norm of corporate and 
debtor-creditor law. 
Whether law can do much good enforcing the norm is a harder 
question.  I suspect that one’s conclusion on this score will depend on 
one’s priors about the efficiency with which and manner in which capital 
markets speak to vertical investor conflict.  Tailored compensation 
packages, coupled with the threat (or promise) of takeover by a single 
owner, may go far in remedying the problem.  But market regulation 
appears imperfect.  To those who believe that prices do a good job of 
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reflecting the underlying state of affairs in a firm, suits charging violation 
of fiduciary obligation or fraudulent transfer may seem a valuable 
complement. 
